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The current global policy discourse on macroeconomics and development has created space for much-
needed re-thinking in macroeconomic policy in the wake of the Great Recession. The IMF, for example, 
has suggested the need to adopt a more flexible appro ch towards inflation targeting, to broaden the goals 
of central bankers and to build up fiscal space during buoyant economic times so that governments can 
fortify their capacity to cope with global economic volatility and market uncertainty. Such reflections 
seemed appropriate in light of the coordinated macroeconomic responses in developed and many 
developing countries that prevented a global recession from becoming a depression. On the other hand, 
the commitment to fiscal consolidation in many OECD countries to bring back public finances  to prudent 
levels have re-ignited the long-standing debate on the (causal) relationship between macroeconomic 
policies, growth, employment and poverty reduction.   
 
The weak global economic climate continues to put downward pressure on Asia-Pacific labour markets in 
terms of employment creation and the quality of jobs. As the ILO’s World Employment and Social 
Outlook for 2015 shows, the number of vulnerably employed continues to increase in South-East Asia 
and the Pacific and South Asia. Although overall unemployment remains typically low in most Asia-
Pacific economies, young people continue to face considerable disadvantages in terms of securing decent 
employment. 
 
This study reviews the available evidence and uses available statistics to assess the extent to which 
macroeconomic management has helped or hindered the goal of attaining full and productive 
employment, with case studies on Vietnam and Thailand. On the basis of this assessment, the study 
suggests policy options for the developing countries in the region.  Increasingly serious concerns about 
the benefits of focusing on a narrow definition of macroeconomic stability motivate this study.  Of main 
concern to the study is the tendency over recent decades to equate policy reform with non-interventionist 
or "neutral" macro policy. 
 
The study, prepared by Professor John Weeks, and funded by the ILO, is also an excellent example of 
collaborative work by the ILO Regional Office for Asia and Pacific and the UNESCAP’s Macroeconomic 
Policy Division in Bangkok. Technical inputs to the report were provided by both ILO and UNESCAP 
staff, led by Sukti Dasgupta from the ILO and Anisuzzaman Chowdhury from UNESCAP, and a meeting 
to disseminate the preliminary findings of the study were held in Bangkok in 2013.  
 
We hope that this study will contribute to the ongoi  discussion on macroeconomics and development, 
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Perhaps the most important empirical finding of this study is the stability of quarterly and annual growth 
rates for Viet Nam and the contrasting instability for Thailand. Evidence strongly supports the view that 
this contrast results from the difference in macroeonomic policies in the two countries. Once policy-
makers discard the ideology calling for continuously balanced budgets, focus can shift to identifying 
priorities for fiscal policies that facilitate stable growth. Stable growth would engender full and 
productive employment and an equitable distribution of growth for poverty reduction. These outcomes do 
not result automatically from the clearing of markets, if they clear at all.  
 
In support of full and productive employment, monetary policy both can and should pursue several 
objectives in addition to the stabilizing of prices. The two most obvious are: (i) facilitating productive 
investment through moderate and stable real interest rates; and (ii) reducing exchange rate fluctuations 
through what might be called exchange rate "smoothing". Exchange rate smoothing does not imply that a 
central bank attempts to maintain the national currency at a target rate to other currencies. 
 
In the pursuit of full and productive employment, the exchange rate serves as an important instrument. It 
should be part of a policy to shift resources towards tradables, if that shift is relevant. Interventio s to 
smooth movements in the nominal exchange rate contribute to stability of aggregate output. 
 
Empirical analysis: Thailand 
 
The Thai economy demonstrated a remarkable rate of growth of output, exports and employment for more 
than 36 years, from 1960 to 1996. Subsequently, output and employment growth have become 
considerably slower and unstable, though well above the rates for the majority of developing countries. 
Of more concern for employment, poverty and general we fare, the macroeconomy has displayed 
substantial instability. 
 
There are obvious policy components to the country’s macroeconomic instability. Perhaps most 
important, Thai fiscal policy has been procyclical since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. 
Second, the overall impact of monetary policy since 2000 appears ambiguous regarding growth. Third, a 
shift from mild regulation to strong deregulation of the external sector, especially the capital account, 
leaves the Government with few tools to cope with what appears to be a major source of macroeconomic 
instability. 
 
Countries do not achieve full and productive employment without pursuing policies designed for this 
goal. Until the global crisis of 2008, the Thai economy grew at a rate more than sufficient to provide full 
and productive employment for its residents. Through application of appropriate policies, the Governmet 
can create the tools to convert growth into full employment, rising real wages and job security. 
 
Empirical analysis: Viet Nam 
 
Although the macroeconomic policies of the Vietnamese Government suffered from mistakes of timing 
and execution, all evidence suggests that they account f r the stability of growth over the past 20 years. 
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This stability is in striking contrast to Thailand’s growth performance. The lack of reliable employment 
statistics covering the two decades makes it impossible to assess progress towards full and productive 
employment. However, the rate and stability of growth provide a framework sufficient for the outcome if 
combined with equitable wage and distribution policies. 
  
The growth process in Viet Nam is not without serious problems. The frequently cited need to restructue 
the financial sector and state enterprises are of secondary importance to a flaw in the growth strategy 
itself. The Vietnamese Government achieved a remarkably smooth transition from central planning to 
market regulation by pursing an export-led growth strategy. Rapidly expanding exports combined with 
long-term capital inflow to stabilize the exchange rate, which facilitated price stability. 
 
For several reasons, the economy now presses against the limits to an export-led strategy. First, an export-
led strategy requires the continuous transfer of resources from non-tradables to tradables. Because both 
categories of goods require that labour have sector-specific skills, the productivity of the transferrd 
labour is likely to decline at the margin. With few exceptions, capital is product specific, which implies 
that the labour transfer must be accompanied by an increase in investment. With total investment well 
over 30 per cent of gross domestic product, further inc eases in investment, like greater labour transfer 
from agriculture, are likely to generate diminishing growth at the margin. 
  
The likelihood is low that the global economy will soon deliver the high rates of growth of trade that 
prevailed before the global crisis. A commonly expressed hope among researchers, though less frequent 
among policy-makers is that the problem of slow growth in international trade might be overcome by the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership. It is not obvious that tis United States-proposed trade agreement will increase 
export opportunities for Viet Nam. The US Senate might not approve this treaty in the near future and 
perhaps even reject it. Were it to be approved by the US Senate, Vietnamese policy-makers would need to 
assess the balance between trade creation and trade diversion. To be specific, it is not clear what 
advantages the Partnership would bring to Viet Nam that are not currently provided by membership in the 
World Trade Organization. 
 
There is no doubt that exports drove the rapid growth of the Vietnamese economy over the past 20 years. 
Global economic prospects and proposed re-organization of domestic finance and state enterprises 
suggest that a more diversified strategy is now requi d. This strategy could place greater emphasis on 
equity via risking wages and domestic demand. Enhancing the voice of workers' organizations would be 











The responsibili ty for opinions expressed in articles, studies and other contributions rests 
solely with the authors, and publication does not constitute an endorsement by the 
International Labour Office of the opinions expressd in them, or of any products, 
processes or geographical designations mentioned. 
About the author 
John Weeks is Professor Emeritus, School of Oriental a d African Studies, the University of London. 
 






ADB  Asian Development Bank 
FDI  foreign direct investment 
GDP  gross domestic product 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
LIBOR  London interbank offer rate 
THB  Thai baht 
UNCTAD Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs  
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
 
 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 1
1. Introduction 
 
This study uses the available analytical and statistical evidence to assess the extent to which 
macroeconomic management has helped or hindered the goal of attaining fuller, or high, and 
productive, employment. On the basis of this assessm nt, the study suggests policy options for the 
developing countries of the Asia–Pacific region. Increasingly serious concerns about the benefits of 
focusing on a narrow definition of macroeconomic stability motivated this study. Of main concern to 
the study is the tendency over recent decades to equat  policy reform with non-interventionist, or 
"neutral", macroeconomic policy. 
 
The standard approach has been to equal macroeconomic stability with inflation targets and a 
combination of current account and reserve accumulation targets. In line with its terms of reference 
(see the Annex), this study takes economic growth, social development and environmental 
sustainability as the primary objectives, with price stability and the external account as flexible 
constraints. Of the three objectives, this study focuses on the quality and structure of economic 
growth. "Quality and structure" refer specifically to the interaction of growth with employment, the 
incomes generated by that employment, and income and wealth distribution. 
 
The central purpose of this analysis is to assess how and whether the macroeconomic policy regimes 
in Thailand and Viet Nam contributed to fuller, or high, and productive employment. Thailand and 
Viet Nam represent singularly appropriate countries to make this assessment. Both have enjoyed 
impressive growth rates over an extended period of time, with this growth generating considerable 
expansion of formal sector employment. Because of the positive growth and employment 
performance in both countries, the emphasis of the analysis centres on the quality of growth and the 
employment generated by that growth. 
 
2. Analytical framework 
 
2.1 Clarifying definitions 
 
To avoid confusion in the analysis that follows, several terms require careful defining. These include 
phrases commonly used to describe macroeconomic poli y and ones that serve as important concepts 
in analytical and empirical discussions. After defining these, the discussion can move to policies. 
 
Central is macroeconomic stability. Formally, this stability has two aspects: a satisfactory 
performance of the domestic economy (internal stabili y) and a sustainable balance of payments 
(external stability). For decades, the standard framework to analyse the simultaneous achievement of 
both was the Mundell-Fleming model. This model held the general price level constant, thus 
contradict the exchange rate flexibility mechanism (Weeks, 2012 and 2013a). In the model, an 
economy achieves internal stability when it sustained a targeted unemployment rate. External 
stability required that foreign exchange inflow equal outflow.  
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Internal stability sets the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate brought about external 
stability. In the most common version of the model, "free" capital flow required that the domestic and 
"world" rates of interest be strictly linked. It foll wed from the Mundell-Fleming framework that the 
exchange rate "floats" and the interest rate is externally determined, so neither is a policy instrument. 
 
Although the Mundell-Fleming model did not suffer explicit rejection, a shift to emphasis on 
inflation as the major macro target rendered it irrelevant. By the 1980s, internal stability meant low 
inflation.1 In the analysis of the so-called Washington Consensus, low inflation facilitated automatic 
adjustment to an appropriate unemployment rate, sometimes called the "natural rate of 
unemployment". Balanced budgets and interest rate adjustments would bring inflation to its target, 
though this active interest rate management contradicted another element in the Consensus – the free 
flow of capital. This framework defined the central focus of governments and central banks to be 
preventing inflation and fiscal deficits. These would be achieved through demand-depressing 
policies, reducing expenditures and raising interest ates.  
 
A macroeconomic policy framework designed directly to achieve positive outcomes of any type 
requires a redefinition of stability. This re-defining need not be new, just a return to the prevailing 
consensus of the post-Second World War period. Following that framework, I define internal stability 
as: (i) the maximum achievable level of employment a d its growth over time; (ii) which is 
consistent with a flexible inflation constraint; and (iii) minimizes inequality pressures originating 
from the commodity and financial markets.  
 
At first glance, this definition may seem unmanageably complex. In practice, it is quite simple and 
was the guideline to macroeconomic policy-making before the Washington Consensus established its 
negative orthodoxy. Government and central banks should dedicate themselves to policies that leave 
the fewest people without work. This goal implies a growth policy.  
 
The specific characteristics of each country determine its growth and employment goals in any 
specific moment. The desired employment outcome requi s governments to use all available policy 
tools in an active manner, which is discussed in the next section. This pragmatic approach to policy 
requires we abandon the narrow definition of macroeonomic stability. 
 
The economic growth associated with employment growth has three important dimensions: rate, 
stability and distribution. Any rate of employment growth requires a faster rate of output growth to 
accommodate increases in productivity. This obvious principle is extremely important for open 
economies in order that they achieve and maintain external stability. The stability of growth 
contributes to optimistic expectations for the private sector, as well as job security for employees. 
Finally, the output structure and distribution betwen profits and wages at the margin determines the 
growth of income shares. 
 
                                                 
1 This narrow treatment of stability contributed to instability in the South-East Asian countries: In the Asia–Pacific region, such 
restrictive macroeconomic policies, aimed at stabilization in a very narrow, sense have led to drastic de lines in public 
infrastructure investment, especially in agriculture, and a rise in economic insecurity. The region was also hit by the worst 
financial crisis, in 1997, despite reasonable macroeconomic stability (MPDD, 2013a, p. 1). 
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The next concept, "full and productive employment", is not difficult to define. There is, however, an 
intrinsic ambiguity in the concept because policy-makers over the past several decades have 
abandoned employment as a goal. The original eight Millennium Development Goals prove perhaps 
the most shocking example. The first of these pledges the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, 
yet nowhere among the eight goals is there mention of the means by which a government might 
achieve that eradication – employment at wages highenough to bring households out of poverty.2 
 
Pursuing this simple idea – of employment that generates incomes above poverty level – will lead to 
a working definition of "full and productive employment" for macroeconomic policy.3 To reach this 
definition, it is first necessary to dispel misconceptions that are engrained in the Washington Consensus 
approach. The most important of these is the previously noted "natural rate of unemployment". The 
analytical essence of this idea is the existence of levels of unemployment uniquely linked to rates of 
inflation (see Friedman, 1968). It carries the policy implication that the level of unemployment associated 
with some low level of inflation is, by definition, full employment. A closely related and less ideological 
terminology for the same idea is "structural unemployment". This concept of natural rate suffers from the 
fallacy of treating the inflation–unemployment relationship as unique and monotonic, which it is not. 
Especially for an open economy with imported price effects, any given level of unemployment can 
exist within a range of inflation rates, and vice-vrsa. 
 
If we discard the ideology of the "natural rate", we can reach the working definition of full 
employment. In an economy in which the overwhelming majority of people are employees, full 
employment refers to a policy-determined target for the unemployment rate. Argentina provides an 
example of a middle-income country of this type. The level at which policy-makers set the target is 
specific to the institutions and political economy of each country. Thailand is in the process of 
moving into this category of countries, with lingering elements of its pre-industrial economy. 
 
No high-income country has a large agriculture sector, nor in any is self-employment a major 
category (except for its misuse in reference to subcontracting arrangements). In the development 
process, the agriculture sector becomes increasingly characterized by wage employment. Therefore, 
in countries in which a substantial portion of the adult population is in self-employment or non-
market working relations, such as family enterprises, full employment takes on a more dynamic 
definition. For these countries, full employment refe s to the rate at which economic growth transfers 
labour from low-productivity activities to those providing incomes in excess of the poverty level. 
Viet Nam falls into this category of countries in the process of transition from a mix of work relations 
to formal wage employment. 
 
                                                 
2 The emphasis on work that lifts households out of poverty can be found in the ILO and Food and Agriculture Organization's 
joint programme, Decent Employment for Agricultural and Rural Development and Poverty Reduction. Ensuri g productive 
and decent work for rural workers is crucial if they are to escape from poverty and have the means to produce or purchase 
adequate and nutritious food. However, efforts to reduce poverty and hunger by raising on-farm and non-farm incomes and 
diversifying livelihoods can be hindered by emerging forms of employment relationships that are based on more flexible and 
casual forms of work. See www.fao-ilo.org/ilo-dec-employ/en/ [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. See also ILO/OECD (2011, p. 1). 
3 The term “full and productive employment” is considerably broader than its macroeconomic component. It is subsumed within 
the ILO socio-economic Decent Work agenda: decent work sums up the aspirations of people in their working lives. It involves 
opportunities for work that is productive and delivrs a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, 
better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and 
participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men. See   
www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
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From a macro perspective, productive employment has two aspects. The more familiar and more 
general characteristic refers to employment that lifts people from poverty and maintains them out of 
poverty. Sustaining non-poverty employment by necessity requires that it be stable. The second 
characteristic derives from the macroeconomic necessity of a sustainable balance of payments. In 
each country, that sustainability requires an approriate balance between employment in the 
production of tradables and non-tradables and productivity growth in the former. 
 
To summarize, full and productive employment refers to the maximum feasible level of wage 
employment in the short run and a target for labour transfer in the medium term, both linked to an 
appropriate balance between tradables and non-tradables. 
 
At the national level, the term “sustainable development” will vary by country. National policies to 
achieve environmentally sound growth include public investment and the regulatory framework. The 
meaning is considerably simpler for short-term macroe onomic policy: stability of the growth rate. 
This stability facilitates the growth of public revnue that governments can allocate to induce more 
environmentally sustainable practices in the private sector as well as the public sector.  
 
With the key terms defined, the next section develops the macroeconomic framework for achieving 
full, or high, and productive employment within a st ble growth path. 
 
2.2 Analytics of country comparisons 
 
The terms of reference for this analysis of Thailand and Viet Nam ask for a comparison of 
experiences regarding macroeconomic policies and outcomes: What policy lessons can be learned 
from the comparative experiences of Thailand and Viet Nam in the macroeconomic policy framework 
that would be needed to reduce poverty and inequality nd promote decent work opportunities? 
 
The terms of reference go on to recommend that in "cross-country comparison purposes, an 
international data source may be advantageous" becaus  of likely inconsistencies in data definitions 
and collection methods among countries. This requirement for direct comparison of Thailand and 
Viet Nam raises questions regarding the purpose and for which issues comparisons are valid. 
 
It is obvious that every country is different, and countries change over time. If difference and change 
rendered comparisons invalid, little analytical work would be possible. The first issue, then, is what 
degree of difference renders a comparison invalid? With regard to South-East Asia, a comparison of 
growth determinants and macroeconomic stability betwe n Singapore and Thailand, between 
Singapore and Viet Nam or between Singapore and any other South-East Asian country would not be 
valid. In one case we have a city-state with no prima y sectors of any importance. In another case we 
have the interaction between agriculture and industry, which is one of the most important dynamics 
of growth and development. The determinants for economic outcomes for a city are unlikely to have 
much relevance for a country with a diversified economy. 
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Having eliminated the obviously non-comparable, the qu stion shifts to whether the characteristics of 
a pair of countries might be so different as to make comparison invalid. One possible difference 
rendering comparison invalid could be large differenc s in per capita income. Two considerations 
cast doubt on non-comparability due to differences in per capita income. First, in the empirical 
literature there is no methodology to judge at what point a quantitative difference in per capita 
income becomes a qualitative barrier to cross-country analysis (see the review of cross-country 
analysis in Quah, 2000).  
 
To use South-East Asian examples, in 2012 the per capita income in Malaysia was $10,400,4 while in 
Thailand it was $5,500 and in Viet Nam it was $1,800 (World Bank, 2013). In assessing differences 
in per capita income for comparative analysis, should the absolute difference, ratios or some other 
calculation be used? If the first, Viet Nam and Thailand would seem a more valid comparison than 
Thailand and Malaysia; if the ratio is used, the asses ment reverses. Including the Philippines, with 
its per capita income of $2,600, makes the assessment ore ambiguous. Second, it is not immediately 
obvious why per capita income should render countries non-comparable rather than population and 
size of the economy. Regarding economic structure, an inspection of statistics would not seem to rule 
out comparison nor the export orientation of each economy.5 
 
In summary, it is possible to validly specify reason  for non-comparability, such as whether a country 
produces petroleum. But in the absence of a clear and accepted methodology for comparability and 
non-comparability, there is no alternative to case-by-case assessments. In this study, I place 
considerable importance on economic stability, as defined in the previous section. The comparability 
issue then becomes specific – is it valid to compare measures of macroeconomic stability for 
Thailand and Viet Nam? This is an empirical and pragm tic issue that should be assessed issue by 
issue. 
 
Assessing and comparing economic stability for Thailand and Viet Nam raises another analytical 
issue: the impact of non-policy factors, especially natural phenomena and political instability. 
Considerable research has addressed the impact of natural disasters, such as the flooding in Thailand, 
on economic growth. An Inter-American Development Bank study concluded: 
“Once these political changes are controlled for, even extremely large disasters do not display 
any significant effect on economic growth. It is also found that smaller, but still very large 
natural disasters, have no discernible effect on output.” (Cavallo et al., 2010) 
 
A study published in World Development in 2012 reached a similar conclusion:  
"Despite the tremendous human suffering caused by natural disasters, their effects on 
economic growth remain unclear, with some studies repo ting negative, and others indicating 
no or even positive effects." (Christiaensen et al., 2012, p. 1317) 
 
 
                                                 
4 All $ currencies are US$. 
5 In 2012, what the World Bank, in its World Development Indicators, defined as industry accounted for 44 per cent of GDP in 
Thailand and 39 per cent in Viet Nam. Agriculture contributed 13 per cent in Thailand and 20 per cent in Viet Nam. In 
Thailand, export revenue represented 75 per cent of GDP and 80 per cent in Viet Nam. 
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Although the people of Thailand suffered severely from the catastrophic floods of 2011, economics 
has no accepted methodology to assess the macroeconomic impact. The direct cost of natural 
disasters can be calculated with some accuracy. However, measuring relative impact of economic and 
non-economic factors on macroeconomic indicators is not possible. Finally, it should be stressed that 
Viet Nam has also suffered from severe weather. Attempts to quantify the growth impact in each 
country are unlikely to provide definitive results. 
 
Since 2000, Thailand has shown considerably more political instability than Viet Nam, especially in 
late 2013 and into 2014 (not covered by the statistics in this study). Whether this can account for 
differences in macroeconomic performance for the two countries is more difficult to assess than the 
macroeconomic impact of natural disasters. Two fundamental problems arise at the outset. First, there 
is considerable debate over the direction of causality – does growth instability generate political 
tensions, or the reverse (Paldam, 1998). Second, we hav  a consensus on the definition of a natural 
disaster. No such consensus exists for "political instability", whose definition is likely to vary across 
countries. 
 
To summarize, when possible, research should assess th  likely impact of natural phenomena and 
political events on macroeconomic behaviour. This as essment, by its nature, will be qualitative and, 
to a degree, subjective. In the following analysis, I deal with these ambiguities by inspecting the 
likely economic factors on macroeconomic outcomes. That does not exclude non-economic 
influences that others might consider relevant. Demonstrating their relevance, however, should be 
evidence-based rather than speculative. 
 
2.3 Neutral and active policy regimes 
 
Achieving socially acceptable employment and distributional outcomes within the Decent Work 
framework requires a short-term macroeconomic strategy that uses all available policy instruments. 
Policy-makers implement the instruments simultaneously to balance the multiple objectives within 
the internal and external constraints. This balancing matches each instrument with an appropriate 
outcome, to thus phase outcomes over the short, mediu  and long terms.  
 
The non-interventionist approach to macroeconomic policy gained ideological dominance during the 
1980s. It derived from the pre-Keynesian ideology in which market economies automatically adjust 
to full employment with stable prices. This approach neutralized or nullified each area of 
macroeconomic management. The requirement that public sector budgets should be governed by a 
deficit target made fiscal policy endogenous, with respect to growth, rather than an instrument to 
manage growth. Current and capital account deregulation, combined with the insistence that 
unmanaged floats or market-determined exchange rates represent "best practice", removed public 
policy from any effective role in influencing external stability. So-called central bank independence 
completed the nullification, leaving governments without macroeconomic policy instruments. 
 
The combination of a balanced budget guideline, an inflation target and non-intervention in foreign 
exchange markets leaves little policy space. This approach might be defensible for high-income 
countries with a relatively stable economic structure and efficient markets. For countries undergoing 
structural change, it replaces macroeconomic management with micro-based nihilism. Few 
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governments of Asian countries, and only for short periods, adopted the extreme version of the 
neutral, or non-intervention, framework. This generalization applies to the two countries chosen for 
this study, Thailand and Viet Nam, though their policies had substantial differences. It is these 
differences as well as the policies that give this study the potential to generate lessons for other 
countries. 
 
This study links fiscal policy to short- and medium-term growth, exchange rate policy to current 
account outcomes, capital account management to overall external stability, and monetary policy to 
medium- and long-term domestic investment. This approach treats inflation as the outcome of all of 




An employment-focused fiscal policy comprises complementary short-term and long-term 
components. In the short term, the purpose of policy instruments is to maintain output at near 
potential, and in the long run, policy interventions seek to increase potential output. Short-term 
macroeconomic management relies on the current fiscal budget and tax instruments (Hailu and 
Weeks, 2009). The long-term component employs public investment to directly increase the 
productive potential of the economy and to “crowd-in” private investment. The employment focus 
also is both short- and long-term in nature. The countercyclical interventions attempt to stabilize or 
reduce unemployment in the labour market. The long-term objectives are employment growth to 
match labour force growth and economic diversification to shift workers to more productive 
activities. Policy-makers in both Thailand and Viet Nam have achieved both. 
 
When countercyclical fiscal intervention is instituonalized into macroeconomic policy, as it would 
in a rational strategy, it implies that the aggregat  demand effect over the economic cycle would be 
neutral in the specific sense defined by Ackley (1965) and Heller (1966) – as no “fiscal drag”.6 The 
concept of fiscal drag is central to an active macroe onomic policy. It states that for an unchanged 
level of public expenditure, a fiscal deficit can result from tax rates too high rather than two low.  
  
Consider an economy operating at below full potential with a negative fiscal balance. Assume that, 
deus ex machine, the economy moves to full potential with no change in the level of expenditure of 
the tax structure. At full potential, there are three possibilities: (i) the increase in tax revenue that 
results from the increase in output is not sufficient to eliminate the negative fiscal balance; (ii) the 
increase in tax revenue exactly closes the fiscal gap, rendering the balance zero; and (iii) the increase 
in tax revenue results in a fiscal surplus. In the first outcome, fiscal drag is negative, in the second it 
is zero, and in the third it is positive.  
 
In the first case, the level of fiscal expenditure is excessively expansionary, and in the third it is less 
than what is required to achieve full potential.7 The implication for short-term macroeconomic 
                                                 
6 In testimony before the US Congress, Ackley (1965) defined fiscal drag as “a constant set of tax rates nd a constant level 
(total) of government expenditures exerts an increasingly restrictive influence as time passes… [O]ver the years we need to 
offset much or all of the drag in order to permit the growth of demand to keep up with the growth of potential output”. 
7 The algebra of fiscal drag is simple. Let Y be national income, and I and G be private investment and government expenditure. 
Let α be the marginal propensity to consume and β the marginal propensity to tax. Assume that at a less than full potential 
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management should be clear. At less than full potential, a fiscal deficit can indicate that taxes are too
high (low?) or expenditures are too low (high?). The current fiscal parameters generate a drag on the 
level of output. This insight allows movement beyond the narrow approach that calls for 
contractionary fiscal measures whenever a deficit appe rs. 
 
In the specific cases of Thailand and Viet Nam, the fiscal drag concept facilitates analysis of the 
extent to which public expenditure and revenue have reinforced or dampened the impressive growth 
rates of the countries over the past 20 years. Of special importance is the stability of quarterly and 
annual growth rates for Viet Nam and the contrasting instability for Thailand. Once policy-makers 
discard the ideology calling for continuously balanced budgets, which is an impossible outcome, 
discussion shifts to identifying the priorities for fiscal policy. Central among these priorities could be 
full and productive employment and an equitable distribution of growth for poverty reduction. These 




Essential to the design of a rational monetary policy in support of employment expansion is: (i) 
recognition that inflation is not a purely monetary phenomenon; and (ii) that the mandate of the 
central bank should allow for multiple objectives and not be limited to suppressing inflation.8 The 
mandates of the central bank in Thailand and Viet Nam allow for multiple objectives.9 
 
The narrow monetary interpretation of the causes of inflation suffers from two general analytical 
problems (see the discussion in Choudhury, 2005b). First, the argument that price increases result 
from increases in the money supply presumes that the latter is exogenous and within the control, or at 
least under the influence, of public sector policy instruments. The simplest version of this argument 
comes from the quantity theory of money, in which eonomic agents carry out all transactions with a 
means of payment derivative from a monetary basis determined by the central bank. For decades, 
economists have hotly contested the presumption that money is exogenous with respect to changes in 
output (see Lavoie, 2006; Dow, 2006). If the means of circulation are endogenous to any extent, the 
monetary interpretation of inflation collapses (Howells, 2006). For small open economies with 
largely unregulated capital accounts, the practical pacity of the central bank to control the 
                                                                                                                                               
level of income, savings equal investment and the public budget is balanced. In the simple case of a closed economy, national 
income equals: Yo = µ[Io + Go] , with µ = [1 - α(1 - β)], the multiplier. 
    Given the propensity to consume, the marginal propensity to save out of post-tax income is (1- α)(1 - β), so the level of saving 
is: So = [(1-α)(1-β)]Yo. If by magic, income rose to its full potential level: Yf, then total leakages would exceed total 
injections because savings would exceed investment and the public budget would be in surplus. National i come would fall 
back to Yo. Reducing tax rates eliminates the fiscal drag.  
8 A United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) policy brief states his clearly, that 
monetary policy should accept "moderate inflation and the use of instruments, such as credit, other than t e policy rate" 
(MPDD, 2013a, p. 2). 
9 The mandate of the State Bank of Vietnam allows for multiple objectives, a heterodox approach that has brought criticism from 
mainstream central bankers. The IMF has repeatedly urged that the State Bank be made legally independent. The mandate of 
the State Bank can be found in its web pages (www.sbv.gov.vn) [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. Although lower in profile in its 
implementation of a heterodox approach, the Bank of Thailand’s flexibility of its policy is obvious on its website: “The Bank 
of Thailand Act, B.E. 2485 was later amended in order to put emphasis on BOT’s social responsibility, to create a mechanism 
to guard against economic crisis, as well as to set up BOT’s decision making process to ensure good governance and 
transparency in the organization. Moreover, members of the public will be able to audit and increase th understanding of the 
BOT’s operations.” See www.bot.or.th/English/AboutBOT/Pages/default.aspx [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 9
monetary base is extremely limited. Thailand and Viet Nam qualify as small in this context. Through 
controls over capital flows, the Vietnamese Governme t has created for the central bank a degree of 
flexibility in monetary policy. 
 
Second, in practice, inflation is a complex process involving three types of commodities: (i) tradables 
whose prices respond to global markets; (ii) non-tradables whose prices reflect domestic demand and 
supply; and (iii) prices linked to institutional agreements that are inflexible in the short run. For b th 
Thailand and Viet Nam, the international price of hydrocarbons has a substantial impact on the 
overall price level, completely beyond the influenc of domestic policy. The de facto mechanism for 
a central bank to restrain prices is through non-tradables. The most important non-tradable is likely to 
be unskilled labour. 
 
From the complex, non-homogenous character of the components of the price level, it follows that 
policies to suppress price changes can have substantial distributional effects. Governments can, to a 
certain extent, moderate or compensate for these eff cts with other polices, such as fiscal 
expenditures. Therefore, an equitable, employment-focused public policy requires the coordination of 
monetary policy with fiscal policy – not pure independence. 
 
In support of full and productive employment, monetary policy both can and should pursue several 
objectives along with price stability. The two most obvious are facilitating productive investment 
through moderate and stable real interest rates and reducing exchange rate fluctuations with what 
might be called exchange rate "smoothing". Exchange rat  smoothing does not imply that a central 
bank attempts to maintain the national currency at a targeted rate to other currencies (see Weeks and 
Mungule, 2013, pp. 7–21). 
 
Exchange rates and capital flow 
 
The conventional approach to the external sector presumes that the government and the central bank 
leave the nominal exchange rate free of intervention (see the Annex, Exchange rate policy). The 
putative outcome should be an exchange rate that produces the "correct" relative return between 
traded and non-traded commodities. Even in theory, this outcome occurs only at full employment,10 
which should make it of limited interest for policy-makers. 
 
A policy framework for the external sector aimed at full and productive employment would not leave 
the current and capital accounts to market regulation. Substantial short-term exchange rate 
fluctuation provoked by global instability can have a depressing effect on investment by both 
domestic and international businesses (MPDD, 2013e). As a practical matter, in the short run, central 
bank exchange rate policy typically seeks to reduce fluctuations without attempting to reverse or alter 
a trend. Before the 1980s, many governments of developing countries practised a multiple exchange 
rate regime. This approach fell out of use for both ideological and practical reasons. In practice, 
multiple exchange rate regimes proved difficult to manage effectively, and governments could 
achieve the desired outcome in administratively simpler ways, such as through taxation of imports or 
                                                 
10 The conclusion derives from the Heckscher-Ohlin model in which all equilibria lie on the production possibilities frontier. The 
Mundell-Fleming model treats changes in output in a one-product economy and makes no such efficiency claim.  
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exports. An exchange rate policy for full and productive employment pursues exchange smoothing in 
the short term and manages depreciations in the longer term. The first aims at price and output 
stability and the second at fostering tradables. 
 
Foreign exchange monitoring is a policy of great importance to central banks and governments with 
or without foreign exchange controls. During the "dregulating 1990s", multilateral lenders tended to 
discourage monitoring as unnecessary. As a result, central banks had no accurate estimate of foreign 
exchange flows, which made a rational exchange rate policy impossible. In practice, liberalizing the 
trade and capital accounts makes monitoring more important. It is the source of key information that 
allows governments and central banks to anticipate ex rnal shocks. 
 
In addition, foreign exchange monitoring is both the necessary condition for an effective capital 
account policy and a policy in its own right (see the Annex, Capital account management). 
Monitoring should enable the public revenue authority to verify whether importers and exporters 
obey tax regulations. Monitoring is the basis for all market-based capital controls. It can take the 
strong form of a requirement that all foreign exchange transactions pass through the central bank, or 
it can make the softer requirement that all only must be reported to the central bank. 
 
The policy on foreign exchange flows in Thailand is close to the reporting end of the spectrum, while 
the State Bank of Vietnam follows a considerably stricter approach.11 In both countries, the 
authorities pursue a policy of exchange rate management. However, in Viet Nam, the Government 
manages the external sector in a much more interventionist manner. In both cases, the tools exist to 
integrate foreign exchange policy with fiscal and monetary policy. 
 
Advocating an active exchange rate policy can result in analytical and empirical confusion because of 
use of terms that carry implicit or explicit subjective judgements. It is common to read that the 
exchange rate "strengthens" or "weakens", meaning appreciation and depreciation, respectively. In 
the same vein, the phrase "improvement in the exchange rate" invariably refers to an appreciation and 
"deterioration" to a depreciation.12 
 
The terminology in which a "strong" exchange rate is one whose value is high or increasing with 
respect to other currencies is a serious obstacle to rational policy, especially for employment. If an
exchange rate "strengthens" when it appreciates, it would be rare to expect a policy-maker to favour 
                                                 
11 In practice, the State Bank of Vietnam closely monitors and regulates foreign exchange flows. See 
www.seacen.org/GUI/pdf/publications/bankwatch/2012/17-SBV.pdf [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. The Bank of Thailand gives the 
following instructions for people and companies receiving and sending foreign exchange. Foreign currencies can be transferred 
or brought into Thailand without limit. Any person receiving foreign currencies from abroad is required to repatriate such funds 
immediately and sell to an authorized bank or deposit them in a foreign currency account with an authorized bank within 360 
days of receipt, except for foreigners temporarily staying in Thailand for not more than three months, foreign embassies, 
international organizations (including their staff with diplomatic privileges and immunities) and Thai emigrants who are 
permanent residents abroad or working abroad. Purchase of foreign currency from authorized banks is generally allowed upon 
submission of documents indicating international trde and investment. Companies in Thailand can engag in derivatives 
transactions with authorized banks to hedge against foreign exchange risk, provided that supporting documents indicating future 
foreign currency receipts or obligations are submitted. Any person bringing into or taking out of Thailand foreign currency bank 
notes in an aggregate amount exceeding $20,000 or its equivalent must declare it to a customs officer. See 
www.bot.or.th/English/ForeignExchangeRegulations/FXRegulation/Pages/ExchangeControlLaw.aspx [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
12 This inference comes from interviews with several officials in both Viet Nam and Thailand. 
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depreciation. Nominal exchange rate movements should be assessed in the context of three types of 
commodities: exportables, importables and non-tradables. Figure 1 demonstrates the implications of 
the three-commodity context (taken from Liang, 1992). The vertical axis measures the price ratio of 
exportables to non-traded commodities and the horizontal axis reflects the ratio of importable prices 
to non-tradable prices.  
 
Non-tradables include most services, transport and commerce. The distinction between exportables 
and importables is country specific and changes over time. For example, in Thailand and Viet Nam 
currently, manufactured commodities are almost all importables, but over time, productivity increases 
could make them internationally competitive and exportable. 
 
At some point in the two dimensional space diagram in figure 1, the production of exportables and 
importables equals their level in the absence of any policy intervention (with X the “on-intervention" 
point). Through this point pass two lines: AA, whic is the locus of all points for which exportable 
production is constant at the non-intervention leve, and BB, which is the same locus for importables. 
The locus AA shows that as the price of importables rises relatively to non-tradable prices, the 
production of exportables can remain constant, only if exportable prices also rise. The same 
interpretation applies to line BB.13 
 
A so-called strong currency tends to drive relative prices into the region indicated as IV, or "pro-non-
tradables". Nominal and real currency appreciation drives the ratio of exportables to non-tradables 
below the non-intervention ratio and also for importables. Thus, the effect of pursuing a strong 
currency policy is to reduce the production of all tradable commodities. The decline of tradable 
production implies a persistent balance of trade deficit, which will make the strong currency policy 
impossible to maintain. 
 
The diagram shows three alternatives to the dysfunctio al policy of discouraging both exports and 
import substitutes. Region I represents export promotion in the strict sense, shifting resources from 
both import substitutes and non-tradables into exportables. It is probably the case that this 
combination of policies applies to Thailand. Region III is the mirror opposite, with stereotypical 
import substitution, where relative prices shift resources out of exportables and non-tradables. 
Historical experience, especially in Latin America but also in sub-Saharan Africa, indicates that this
policy approach is unsustainable because it tends to generate trade deficits, though not as extreme as 
in region I.  
 
Finally, region III results in relative prices that promote both exports and import substitutes. This 
corresponds to policies followed by several of the industrializing Asian countries, most obviously the 
Republic of Korea but also Viet Nam. Achieving this combination requires currency depreciation in 
line with domestic inflation. Figure 1 demonstrates how a strong currency policy can undermine 
growth in the short run and diversification in the medium term. This conclusion does not imply its 
opposite. A "weak currency" does not necessarily result in a "strong economy". To assess in more 
detail the appropriate exchange rate policy for a country, it is necessary to be country specific. 
 
                                                 
13 The lines AA and BB would pass through the origin f, and only if, the economy produced no non-traded commodities. 
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Rate management should avoid ideology of the non-intervention "free market" variety and the 
dysfunctional strong currency approach. The most important guides to effective exchange rate policy 
are (i) the economic objectives of the government and (ii) country-specific exchange rate dynamics. 
Policy-makers in Thailand and Viet Nam have followed different strategies that, in both countries, 
are pragmatic rather than ideological.  
  




During the three decades after the Second World War, external imbalances tended to stifle growth in 
developing countries, especially in Latin America. The shift to an emphasis on the production of 
tradables, balanced between importables and exportables, facilitated overcoming the external 
constraints to growth, most notably in East and South-East Asia. This shift should not lead to a neo-
mercantilist growth strategy in which trade surplus becomes a driving objective.  
 
On the contrary, part of the growth and diversification in Thailand and Viet Nam has been and will be 
inflows of direct investment. Except in rare cases, direct investment simultaneously generates and 
finances an increase in intermediate and capital imports. Thus, we would expect a rational policy 
outcome to be a current account deficit financed by a capital account surplus, especially in Viet Nam, 
which is considerably less developed than Thailand.  
 
Exchange rate regimes 
 
Another analytical issue requires clarification prior to initiating the empirical part of the case studies 
included in this paper. The standard analytical approach to exchange rate regimes, whether in 
textbooks or policy discussions, divides them into tw  broad categories: "fixed" and "flexible", with 
"floating" and "market determined" used as synonyms for the latter. Both in practice and in theory, 
this dichotomy is far too simplistic (Chowdhury, 2005a, p. 37ff).  
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The fixed/flexible dichotomy represents a holdover from the Bretton Woods system in which all 
exchange rates other than those of countries in the trading system of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics were linked via membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with the US dollar 
the reserve currency to which all were tied. This arrangement had the status of an international treaty. 
By formal agreement, no government would alter its exchange rate to the dollar without advising the 
IMF that it intended to do so (though no rational government could adhere to this obligation).14  
 
Under the Bretton Woods system, the link of each currency to the US dollar was both fixed and 
formal, in the sense that countries could seek support from the IMF to maintain the rate. In an 
interesting irony of unintended consequences, black market or multiple exchange rate mechanisms 
supported the "fixivity" of the official currency rate. With the passing of the Bretton Woods system in 
1971, exchange rate regimes differed by the extent to which governments intervened to maintain a 
targeted rate, the mechanisms used for the intervention and the policy framework to support the 
intervention.  
 
The IMF annual reports illustrate the descriptive inadequacy of the dichotomy in a table – located at 
the end that lists exchange rate regimes in 13 categories.15 The descriptive inadequacy follows from 
the theory of exchange rates. To maintain a specific urrency rate, or to "fix" it, a central bank must 
buy or sell foreign exchange. That action would occur in response to a deviation of the exchange rate 
from its fixed target, either an appreciation or depreciation. During the time requiring action to 
realign the currency to the target, the exchange rate is in theory flexible. Thus, it is more accurate to 
use the term “degree of intervention”, with a spectrum from high to low. Finally, countries have a 
choice as to what the targeted rate will refer (a single currency or a "basket"), making the term 
"fixed" all the more problematic. 
 
The analysis of this section reaches a conclusion similar to that for fiscal and monetary policy. In the 
pursuit of full and productive employment, the exchange rate serves as an important instrument. It 
should be part of a policy to shift resources towards t adables if that shift is relevant. Interventios to 
smooth movements in the nominal rate contribute to the stability of aggregate output. 
 
3. Empirical and statistical analysis 
 
3.1 Analytical introduction 
 
This study combines qualitative and quantitative information to characterize the macroeconomic 
practices in two South-East Asian countries (see th Annex, Collection of information). The terms of 
reference mandate this approach. The study also includes information gathered from discussions with 
major stakeholders, including government policy-makers. Of central importance is a clear 
understanding of the major macro tendencies. Of equal importance is the perception of policy-makers 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of what some call the First Bretton Woods and its demise, see Weeks (2013b). 
15 Of the 188 members of the IMF, only 25 fell into what could be reasonably interpreted as freely floating. See 
www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2006/eng/0706.htm [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
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as to their motivations and of the outcomes of their policy interventions, be those perceptions 
accurate or inaccurate. 
In its statistical analysis, this study separates short- and long-term tendencies and dynamics. Because 
of the structural changes in South-East Asian economies, it is not analytically sound to seek long-
term parametric estimates of behavioural dynamics. Long-term and even many short-term 
interactions are appropriately treated with qualitative, non-parametric techniques. For the short term, 
econometric techniques are potentially useful. The guiding principle for all the statistical analysis is 
that it should be clear and understandable to non-ec omists and directly relevant to policy 
discussions. In this context, it is extremely important to form a clear impression of the priorities and 
major stakeholders within and outside governments. 
 
A central theme of the case studies is the extraordina y difference in the stability of the growth rates 
of the two countries. Figure 2 reflects this difference clearly. Over 19 years (74 quarters), the 
Vietnamese economy grew at an annual equivalent rate of 7 per cent, with a coefficient of variation 
of 0.2. By contrast, the Thai economy grew at 3.3 per cent, a rate associated with a coefficient of 
variation of 1.6 (standard deviation of 60 per cent larger than the mean). To a great extent, this huge 
difference in variability can be explained by the macroeconomic policies of the governments of the 
two countries. 
 
Figure 2. Annualized quarterly growth rates in Thai land and Viet Nam, 1995q1–2013q2 (period average an d 
coefficient of variation in legend) 
 
 
Sources: See Figures 4 and 16. 
 
3.2 Case study of Thailand 
 
Economic trends pre- and post-global crisis 
 
Twenty years ago, the World Bank published its controversial Asian Miracles report (World Bank, 
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1993), in which Thailand had a major role as a model f rapid growth with an equitable distribution 
of that growth. During the subsequent two decades, s veral major regional and global crises have cast 
doubt upon some of the policies and outcomes previously hailed as "best practice", all the more as 
the global recovery appears sluggish at best (MPDD, 2013c). 
 
Figure 3 traces two macroeconomic variables, the aggregate growth rate and the overall external 
balance of goods and services. The time series divide themselves into two obvious periods. During 
1961–96, gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an annu l average of 7.7 per cent, with a strikingly 
low coefficient of variation of slightly less than one third. During these 36 years, the trade balance 
was negative in all but three (1961, 1986 and 1987). Per capita income increased by a factor of 6.5, 
growing at 5.6 per cent per annum. 
 
After these years of rapid and steady growth, the economy plunged into severe growth instability, 
averaging barely 3 per cent per annum during 1996–2012, with a coefficient of variation five times 
what it had been in the previous period. This instability and slow growth coincided with a dramatic 
shift from trade deficits to trade surpluses. By definition, the trade balance reversal manifests itself in 
a capital account reversal. From experiencing net capital inflows during 1961–96, the Thai economy 
became a net capital exporter.  
 
Figure 4 takes a closer look at GDP performance, inspecting quarterly movements during 1994–2013. 
Here the statistics suggest three periods: first, the 16 quarters from 1995q2 through 1999q1, inclusive 
of the Asian financial crisis. These years include a reversal of the growth by more than 25 percentage 
points, from 11.6 per cent (1995q2) to -14.9 and -15 per cent (1998q2 and 1998q3). The next period, 
1993–2000, almost eight full years, the growth rate v raged 5 per cent after an initially uneven 
recovery. However, the instability during the Asian crisis returned in 2008 in a more extreme 
manifestation. The continuing instability into the 2010s suggests that the enthusiasm over the 2010 
recovery was premature, reflecting excessive optimism.16 
 
Table 1 indicates that the two external crisis periods were simultaneous, with little shift in the outp t 
structure between tradables and non-tradables. The years of recovery and relatively stable growth, 
1999–2007, included a substantial rise in the tradable sectors' contribution to aggregate value added. 
Even though employment statistics are less likely to be accurate than national income statistics, the 
numbers seem consistent with sector-output growth. T e statistics indicate that agricultural 
employment grew at a trend rate of 0.4 per cent during 1995–2012, while output increased at 2.7 per 
cent. The implied labour productivity, at 2.3 per cent, is consistent with an agriculture sector’s 
ongoing technological modernization.17 
 
If accurate, the higher rate of productivity growth in manufacturing, at 3.6 per cent, indicates a rate
of employment expansion that would be insufficient to bring a substantial shift of people out of low-
productivity activities. However, annual employment xpansion, at 1.8 per cent in manufacturing, is 
more than sufficient to provide employment for increments in the labour force, given the country's 
                                                 
16 In an IMF article entitled "Thailand, Roaring Back Boosted by Trade and Sound Economics", the first sen ence reads: "After 
suffering the double blow of a collapse in global tr de and domestic political disturbances, Thailand’s economy has staged a 
remarkable comeback". See www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/car101510d.htm [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
17 Labour productivity is discussed in more detail in ILO, 2013, pp. 44–47. 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 16
low rate of population increase (less than 1 per cent per annum). The contraction of the economy 
after 2007 substantially reduced the rate of growth of manufacturing employment.18 
 
Earnings statistics indicate more complicated outcomes. Figures 5 and 6 reflect quarterly average 
monthly earnings in constant prices. The deflator is the private consumption index from GDP 
statistics for 2001–10. To reduce seasonal fluctuations in the quarterly statistics, the original time 
series are converted to four-quarter moving averages. Each quarter's values are measured as 
percentage-point deviations from the previous quarter. In the legend, the baht (THB) figures for the 
previous quarter are converted to US dollars. 
 
In Figure 5, earnings are divided between private and public employees. After stagnating during 
2001–04, private sector earnings began a steady rise to the end of 2008. Earnings fell during 2009, 
then recovered in 2010. At the end of 2010, private earnings in real terms were less than 5 per cent 
above their value at the beginning of the decade. Public sector earnings rose rapidly and began a 
decline after early 2005. Nevertheless, public earnings were more than double the private earnings by 
the end of 2010. 
 
Within the private sector, as shown in Figure 6, real arnings rose substantially in agriculture but 
stagnated in the other major sectors of manufacturing, construction, and trade and vehicle repairs. 
For the non-agriculture sector, real earnings at the end of 2010 were less than their peak during the 
decade. Particularly striking is the real earnings stagnation for manufacturing, the country's most 
dynamic sector. During 2001–2010, manufacturing value added increased at an annual average of 5.7 
per cent. Over the same period, real earnings rose by slightly less than 0.1 per cent per annum.  
 
The stagnation of non-agricultural wages while output and productivity rose rapidly implies a 
substantial redistribution of value added from employees to employers in the private sector. Jiyuan 
Wang, Director for the ILO Country Office for Thailnd, Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, cited this redistribution and the associated decline in the aggregate income share of labour 
as a present and future constraint on equitable growth: "Wages are a vital component of domestic 
demand, making wage policy central to this debate, s well as to a more equitable future for 
Thailand."19 Despite the obvious stagnation in wages during the first decade of this century, the IMF 
warned the Bank of Thailand to be "vigilant" for inflation-generating wage increases.20 The following 
discussion on monetary policy demonstrates the low probability of Thailand suffering from a rate of 
inflation sufficient to cause policy concern. 
 
The stagnation of non-agricultural wages and the implied redistribution from labour to capital casts 
some doubt on the statistics in Table 3 for poverty head count ratios and the national Gini coefficient. 
                                                 
18 Son and San Andres (2009, p. 24) comment on this decline: “In Thailand, as exports declined due to weak consumer demand 
abroad, workers in the industrial sector were the first to get laid off as early as the first quarter of 2008. At the same time, 
employment in agriculture significantly increased, suggesting that laid-off workers returned to the fields.” 
19 The full text of his article on wage policy in Thailand in the global context is found at 
www.ilo.org/asia/info/public/WCMS_161480/lang--en/index.htm [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
20 The IMF made the warning in a press release on 17 June 2013: “The Bank of Thailand’s accommodative monetary stance is 
appropriately supporting the economy. However, the Bank of Thailand should continue to be vigilant to demand and wage 
pressures, and stand ready to normalize interest rates if overheating pressures emerge or inflation picks up.” See 
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13212.htm [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
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Even without considering the possible wage impact, the numbers in the first two columns indicate a 
non-credible decline in head count ratios for the international and national measures from 2006 to 
2010, which includes the global crisis. The combination of five consecutive quarters during 2008–09, 
when GDP contracted in real terms with stagnant real wages, does not render a fall in poverty 
impossible, but certainly unlikely.  
 
For the same reasons, the reported decline in the overall Gini coefficient, from 42 in 2006 to 39 in 
2010, defies explanation. Easier to rationalize but still not entirely credible are the urban and rural 
Gini coefficients in the final two columns. In the case of the latter, its decline after 2006 coincides 
with falling agricultural wages after several years of increase (see figure 6). The near constant urban 
Gini coefficient would not seem consistent with stagn nt real wages in manufacturing, construction, 
and trade and repairs (again, figure 6). 
 
If the statistics in table 3 are valid, they should be complemented by other measures of inequality and 
well-being. There can be no reasonable doubt that te impressive growth performance of Thailand 
has not in recent years been equitably distributed. To generate greater equity at the margin, the role 
and strength of trade unions needs enhancing. The Government could use the minimum wage to 
enhance inclusive growth (MPDD, 2013d). Although output and employment growth have been 
sufficient for the objective of full and productive mployment that would reduce poverty, the 
instability of that growth and the stagnation of wages have served as a constraint on achievement. 
 
Table 1. Major tradable sectors, share of national income in Thailand, 1995–2011  
Year Agriculture  Mining  Manuf acturing    Tradables  
1995 9.3 1.4 27.0 37.7 
1996 9.3 1.6 26.6 37.5 
1997 9.4 1.9 27.6 38.9 
1998 10.7 2.0 28.5 41.2 
1999 9.2 2.0 29.3 40.5 
2000 8.7 2.4 29.2 40.3 
2001 8.8 2.5 28.9 40.2 
2002 9.0 2.5 29.8 41.3 
2003 9.9 2.6 31.1 43.5 
2004 9.7 2.6 31.0 43.4 
2005 9.7 3.1 31.3 44.0 
2006 9.8 3.2 31.6 44.7 
2007 9.7 3.2 32.0 44.9 
2008 10.5 3.4 31.9 45.7 
2009 10.2 3.3 30.9 44.3 
2010 11.0 3.3 32.8 47.2 
2011 11.8 3.4 30.6 45.8 
 
 Source: ADB, 2013, www.adb.org/statistics [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
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Table 2. Employment and constant price output in Th ailand, 1995–2012 
     Employ ment ( ‘000) CP output ( THB billion ) 
Year Agriculture  Manuf acturing  Agric ulture  Manuf acturing  
1995 14 389 4 608 412 118 
1996 13 986 4 329 433 126 
1997 14 145 4 303 431 135 
1998 13 407 4 264 434 137 
1999 13 804 4 274 455 136 
2000 13 830 4 650 486 151 
2001 13 612 4 927 501 165 
2002 14 042 5 052 502 177 
2003 13 880 5 299 562 184 
2004 13 634 5 476 555 198 
2005 13 617 5 588 555 208 
2006 14 171 5 504 577 216 
2007 14 306 5 619 588 228 
2008 14 699 5 453 605 240 
2009 14 693 5 374 597 249 
2010 14 547 5 350 593 265 
2011 14 619 5 480 627 269 
2012 15 142 5 733 n.a. n.a. 
Growth 
rate 0.4  1.8 2.7 5.4 
 
Notes: CP=output in constant prices of 2002. Growth rates are from simple linear 
regression lines. THB=Thai baht. n.a.= not available. 
Source: ADB, 2013, www.adb.org/statistics [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
 
 
Table 3. Poverty head count ratios and the Gini coe fficient in Thailand, 1988–2010 
      PHCR (%)      Gini  coefficient   
Year  $2/day NPL National  Urban Rural  
      
1988 41.0 65.3 44  
 
1990 37.1 58.1 45  
 
1992 30.0 50.1 48  
 
1994 20.5 42.7 44  
 
1996 14.6 35.3 43  
 
1998 15.3 38.7 42  
 

























Note: PHCR=poverty head count ratio; $2/day=% living below; NPL=national poverty 
line. 
Sources: Poverty head count ratios are from World Bank, 2013, as are the Gini 
coefficients for 1988–98, which are for the entire country. The urban and rural Gini 
coefficients are from ILO, 2013, p. 66. The last two from the ILO reference are for 2007 
and 2009. 
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coeff var = 1.57
average = 7.7
coeff var = 0.32
  
Source: World Bank, 2013, constant 2002 US dollars. 
 
 




















































































































































































































Notes: yr-yr (NSA)=rate of growth compared with the same quarter in the previous year, not seasonally adjusted; 
yr-yr (4 qrtr MA)=moving average of current three preceding quarters of same time series. 
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Figure 5. Average monthly earnings in constant pric es in Thailand, 2001q1–2010q4 (all employees, four-








































































































































































































Note: Numbers in the legend are monthly earnings, four-period average for 2010q4, using the official exchange rate of THB29.9 to the US dollar, 
deflated using private consumption price index. 
Source: Bank of Thailand, Table EC_RL_014: Average wage classified by industry, www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/Standard/SDDS/Pages/sdds.aspx 
[accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
 
 
Figure 6. Average monthly earnings in constant pric es by sector in Thailand, 2001q1–2010q4 (four-quart er 



































































































































































































Note: Numbers in the legend are monthly earnings, four-period average for 2010q4, using the official exchange rate of THB29.9 to the US dollar, 
deflated using private consumption price index. 
Source: Bank of Thailand, Table EC_RL_014: Average wage classified by industry, www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/Standard/SDDS/Pages/sdds.aspx 





Over the past 20 years, Thailand experienced two major economic contractions, both coming from 
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the global economy: the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s and the global financial crisis at 
the end of the 2000s. The principle task of this section is to assess the response of fiscal policy to 
those crises.  
 
Figure 7 shows the annual Thai fiscal balances during 1995–2012, divided between the current and 
capital accounts. Over those 18 years, the balances behaved as would be expected – a relatively 
stable capital account balance and a current account balance responding to the short-term movements 
in national income. The chart relates a simple story: Capital expenditure was financed in part by 
borrowing and current expenditure covered by revenues closely linked to the current level of output. 
 
Figure 8 compares the growth of GDP to that for consta t-price public expenditure and the overall 
deficit as a share of GDP. The movement in the deficit has a cyclical pattern, becoming negative 
during the two crises periods (1997–99 and after 2007). The 2010 World Economic Situation and 
Prospects report listed Thailand as one of more than 30 developing countries to introduce a fiscal 
stimulus in response to the global financial crisis. The report assigned the stimulus a value of $39 billion, 
which implied the largest stimulus relative to GDP of any country in the table (at 14.3 per cent, see 
UNDESA, 2010, p. 20). However, Thailand does not appe r in a much shorter list of countries initiating 
stimuli in the Trade and Development Report 2011 (UNCTAD, 2011, p. 43).  
 
The percentage changes in real fiscal expenditure in Figure 8 support the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) finding rather than that of the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA).21 Whether matched for the same year or with a one-year lag 
(not shown), the changes in expenditure and GDP suggest a procyclical relationship. This interpretation 
clearly applies to 1997–98 and 2010–13. However, the IMF interpreted fiscal policy as expansionary 
during 2011–12:  
“Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis and the devastating 2011 floods, the 
expansionary fiscal policy pursued in recent years wa justified, aimed at supporting aggregate 
demand and reconstruction activities. But now, the str ngth of the ongoing economic recovery 
provides an opportunity to gradually withdraw the fiscal stimulus, create fiscal space for priority 
infrastructure spending, and rebuild policy buffers to address future possible shocks.” See 
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13212.htm [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
 
 
The IMF provides no statistical evidence in support of an expansionary fiscal policy. An IMF Working 
Paper in 2013 refers to fiscal expansion in Indonesia and the Philippines but not Thailand (IMF, 2013, pp. 
1–2). The annual data in Figure 8, as well as the quarterly data from the same source, indicate that 
movements in the growth rate and expenditure were simultaneous. Given the well-documented lag 
between fiscal expenditure and the output response it provokes, simultaneity implies a procyclical not 
countercyclical policy. 
 
The IMF optimism about the post-crisis recovery follows their optimistic assessment of the impact of the 
global economics crisis on the Thai economy. Their view is summarized in a chapter title in the 2008 
                                                 
21 No specific sources are given for the statistics in the table of stimuli in the UNDESA report. Both te UNDESA and the 
UNCTAD sources note that fiscal policy does not include all forms of economic stimuli. Both seek to focus on the fiscal policy 
affect, narrowly defined as central government expenditure. 
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Selected Issues report, "Much ado about nothing?" (IMF, 2008). As shown in Figure 4, the downturns 
proved considerably more severe than the IMF or natio l policy-makers anticipated, at a negative 8 per 
cent in 2008 and even greater in 2011. In contrast with the IMF, the Asian Development Bank's Outlook 
Update 2013 refers to the likelihood of fiscal contraction rather than expansion (ADB, 2013, pp. 164–
167). 
 
The ADB interpreted the Government's fiscal policy response to the Asian financial crisis of the second 
half of the 1990s as expansionary: "The recovery that began in 1999 continued in 2000, stimulated by 
strong export growth and three fiscal packages" (ADB, 2000, p. 37).22 Inspection of Figure 8 provides 
some support for this judgement, with real fiscal expenditure increasing by about 5 per cent in 1998, 
followed by a reversal from GDP contraction to expansion in 1999. 
 
To summarize, the Thai Government may have used fiscal policy actively to counter the severe 
contraction during the Asian financial crisis. In contrast, no strong evidence supports its use of fiscal 
policy as a countercyclical tool after 2007. Partly as a result of the procyclical nature of fiscal policy, 
GDP growth was extremely unstable. This instability slowed the growth of employment and real wages. 
As a result, little progress was made towards achieving full and productive employment. 
 
Figure 7. Annual fiscal balances in Thailand, 1995– 2012 
 
Source: ADB, 2013; National Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO), http://eng.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=95, Table 2 [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Again, one finds a contrast with the IMF position, "Despite uncertainty about the evolution of the global economy, the Thai 
economy is expected to rebound sharply." (IMF, 2012, p. 1) 
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Figure 8. Percentage change in GDP growth rate and fiscal expenditure and the fiscal deficit as a shar e of 
































































































Note: Expenditure for 2013 was estimated from the first two quarters, applying a seasonal adjustment multiplier. 




In contrast to its fiscal policy, it appears that the Bank of Thailand applied monetary instruments in a 
countercyclical fashion. Such was the judgement of the IMF in 2013 when it said, "The Bank of 
Thailand’s accommodative monetary stance is appropriately supporting the economy." However, it is not 
clear that, in Thailand, the accommodating monetary policy on its own had a substantial countercyclical 
impact.  
 
Recent monetary statistics appear to support the IMF assessment that monetary policy was "supporting 
the economy". Figure 9 shows nominal interest rates for the Thai one-month treasury bill (T-bill), for ten-
year bonds and the London interbank offer rate (LIBOR). Through mid-2009, the T-bill rate tracked the 
LIBOR down, before rising in 2010–11. Figure 10 shows the rate of change of the price-deflated 
monetary base (M1) and the ten-year bond rate, adjusted for inflation. Although the real growth of the 
monetary base could be interpreted as accommodating fter 2008, its impact during 2005–08 is less clear. 
The movement of the bond rate shows the opposite – it is more favourable to economic expansion before 
2008 than after. During the first 15 quarters in the c art, the real bond rate averaged slightly less than 0.5 
per cent and only once rose above 2 per cent. During the subsequent 18 quarters, the average was 1 per 
cent, rising above 2 per cent in six quarters. 
 
More important than real interest rates and the monetary base, following the Asian financial crisis the 
Thai Government adopted an inflation-targeting policy for the central bank (IMF, 2006, p. 2). In 
principle, inflation targeting need not subvert other macroeconomic objectives. If the inflation target was 
set in the low teens, for example, it should be possible in most developing countries to pursue active fiscal 
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policy and purposeful exchange rate management. An inflation target of 10 per cent would, in most 
circumstances, allow for moderate real wage increases and nominal depreciation to foster a shift from 
non-tradables to tradables.23 
 
In practice and almost without exception, inflation targeting seeks to maintain inflation rates that 
constrain growth. For 36 years, from 1961 to 1996, the Thai economy grew at an average rate of almost 8 
per cent, with 7.3 per cent in the 1980s the lowest d cade average.24 During the seven years from 1990 to 
1996, growth averaged 8.6 per cent (see the discussion in Weeks, 2010, pp. 172–174). When the economy 
recovered from the Asian financial crisis, the growth rate for 2000–07 fell to 5 per cent under the 
inflation-targeting regime. 
 
It is not difficult to understand why a low inflation target resulted in a reduction of growth. From 2000 to 
2007, the rate of change of the GDP aggregate output deflator averaged 2.9 per cent. As is well known, 
the measured rate of inflation overstates actual price increases because of changes in the quality of 
products and the introduction of new products (Lisman, 1980). In the United States, the congressionally 
mandated Boskin Commission concluded that about 1.1 percentage points of the United States’ GDP 
deflator represented quality change and new products (Boskin, 1996). On the website of the European 
Central Bank, a non-technical discussion of inflation states that 2 per cent per annual should be 
interpreted as price stability.25 
 
If the contribution of quality change and new products is slightly more than 1 percentage point in the 
United States, which has a mature economy with relativ y slow changes in the structure of output and 
consumption, it would be considerably higher in Thailand, perhaps closer to 2 percentage points. Further, 
in a market economy, the mechanism by which resources are reallocated among sectors is through price 
increases that signal rising profits. These two considerations alone suggest that an annual rate of price
increases in the 3–4 per cent range would imply non-i flationary growth. Therefore, it is probable that the 
actual rate of inflation during 2000–07, at 2.9 perc nt, reflected a deflationary pressure forced on the 
economy by the inflation-targeting regime, as standard theory would predict.26 
 
In addition to the possibility that monetary policy has been deflationary since the Asian financial crisis, 
the effect of low inflation has probably contributed to growing inequality. As Chowdhury has argued 
(2005b), contrary to oft-repeated assertions, low inflation harms those at the lower end of the income 
distribution, most obviously but not only through rep essing nominal wage growth (see also Nidhiprabha, 
2013, pp. 5–6); her argument was verified empirically in a paper by Galli and van der Hoeven (2001). 
 
In addition to the direct distributional effect of a low inflation policy, it appears that in Thailand, the 
successful attempt to repress inflation was associated with an inequality that reinforced change in relative 
prices. From 1995 through 2012, the food component of the consumer price index rose by almost 120 
percentage points, while non-food items increased by less than 50 percentage points (Figure 11). At the 
                                                 
23 The 10 per cent rate represents a conservative interpretation of Bruno and Easterly (1998), who estima e that considerably high 
inflation has no statistically significant impact on growth. This is supported by the Ayisi study of Ghana (2013). 
24 Inflation, by decades, was relatively low, at 3.1 per cent (in the1960s), 7.2 per cent (1970s), 5.2 per cent (1980s) and 4.9 per 
cent (1990–96) in the World Development Indicators 2013 (World Bank). 
25 See European Central Bank, www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/educational/html/index.en.html [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
26 If an economy is at less than full employment with imperfectly adjusting markets, monetary restraint will tend to depress out. 
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same time, producer prices rose at a similar rate to food prices, another inequality generating relative 
price change. Rising food prices reduced real incomes and rising producer prices raised profits of 
producers. This pattern follows the analysis in section 2.  
 
To repeat that analysis, in an open economy, the monetary authorities have little impact on the price of 
tradables. Therefore, non-tradables must bear most of the weight of adjustment. It follows that in an open 
economy, reducing inflation in practice often means wage restraint. 
 
In summary, it is unlikely that monetary policy in Thailand made a contribution towards full and 
productive employment. To the extent that policy suppressed the overall inflation rate, it also suppressed 
nominal wage growth. Subsumed within the lower inflation calculations were relative price changes 
unfavourable to poverty reduction and presenting the increase of inequality. The Thai Government should 
reconsider its inflation-targeting policy and redesign it into a more flexible approach (see MPDD, 2013b).  
  































Source: Bank of Thailand, www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/Pages/index1.aspx [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
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Source: Bank of Thailand, www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/Pages/index1.aspx [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
 
Figure 11. Price indices in Thailand, 1995–2012 (pe rcentage point deviation from 1995) 
 
Note: The food and non-food indices are from the national consumer price index. The producer price index refers to wholesale prices. 




The Thai economy has been extremely successful in generating exports. This section suggests that policy-
makers have shown less success in preventing the openness of the economy from generating internal 
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instability. The instability provides a prima facie case for policy action on the capital account in addition 
to measures introduced in the mid-2000s. 
 
As Figure 12 shows clearly, since 2000 the baht has undergone an almost continuous appreciation, with 
the official dollar rate and the trade weighted rate virtually the same. Nominal appreciation is not a source 
of concern. On the contrary, if productivity in tradable sectors grows faster in one country, compared with 
its trading partners, its exchange rate should appreciate. To prevent it from doing so would imply a 
mercantilist trade policy. 
 
In an open economy such as Thailand's, the relevant measure of the real exchange rate is the price ratio of 
tradables to non-tradables. Figure 13 presents this measure, treating agriculture and manufacturing as 
tradables and construction and services as non-tradables (services include the financial sector). This 
measure raises policy concerns, especially for agriculture, whose price index fell continuously from early 
1993 through 2008, after which it stabilized before declining again. In contrast, the internal terms of trade 
for the manufacturing sector have fluctuated around a ten-year average, with no trend.  
 
The downward trend for the agriculture sector could be cause for concern because employment in that 
sector in 2012 was three times employment in manufact ring, although it grew slower over the past 
decade. And even though a shift of labour from agriculture to industry in the process of Thailand's rapid 
growth is expected, this does not explain a fall in the internal terms of trade of the sector. The trend is all 
the more puzzling because food prices rose faster than prices for non-food (see figure 11). These trends 
might imply lagging productivity in the food-producing sectors. 
 
The external sector has functioned as the driving force in Thailand’s growth and development. Over the 
past decade, it has also been the driver of instability, especially in the growth rate. Figure 14 illustrates 
that the terms of trade, measured as the ratio of brder prices of exports to imports, manifest a pronounced 
cyclical pattern.27 
 
More important has been the instability of the capital account. Figure 15 shows the most volatile elemnt 
in the capital account – net portfolio flows – along with the GDP growth rate. The former is measured as 
a percentage of the eight-year average and the latter s a percentage of the growth rate. Most of the 
quarters of stable growth, from 2005q1 to 2008q1, coincided with relatively low and stable portfolio 
flows (until the last quarter of 2007). Subsequently, the severe fluctuations in the growth rate, a swing of 
20 percentage points during 2009, occurred simultaneously with large reversals in portfolio flows.28 
 
The destabilizing effect of capital flows prompted the Government to introduce regulations in 2006. 
Perhaps the most important of these was the requirement that banks hold reserves at 30 per cent of the 
short-term inflows, which would be released when the funds had remained in Thailand for one year. 
                                                 
27 The measure in Figure 13 is not seasonally adjusted. For the purpose of assessing its impact on domestic stability, seasonal 
adjustment is not appropriate. 
28 The even larger change in the growth rate after 2011q4 was, in great part, the result of the severe flooding during the monsoon 
season. 
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However, subsequent deregulation probably left the Government less able to influence short-term flows.29 
 
Although considerable more research is required, it would appear that an extremely liberalized external 
sector has contributed to macroeconomic instability in Thailand and not to welfare gains, as some have 
suggested (Townsend and Ueda, 2007). This instability has weakened the ability of the Government and 
the economy to generate full and productive employment. Also, the external instability has strengthened 
tendencies to greater inequality, because those at the higher income levels can take advantage of 
speculative opportunities created by macroeconomic instability. 
 
Figure 12. Two measures of the nominal exchange rat e in Thailand, 1995–2012 (percentage-point deviatio ns 


















































































Source: ADB, 2013. 
 
 
                                                 
29 An IMF working paper on capital controls in the region summarizes the de-regulation as follows: “The authorities also 
extensively liberalized capital outflows to stem appreciation pressures. During 2007–08, the BOT raised th  limit on overseas 
portfolio investments by residents, including certain institutional investors and Thai-listed companies. The ceiling on outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) was also raised for investments in affiliated companies in January 2007. The deadline for 
repatriating foreign exchange proceeds was extended in February, allowing residents to keep their proceeds abroad in foreign 
currency longer, thereby relieving some of the pressure on the exchange market. In the same vein, regulations governing 
residents’ foreign currency deposits and real estat investments were relaxed in July 2007 and February 2008” (Baba and 
Koykenyne, 2011, p. 10). 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 29
Figure 13. Two measures of the real exchange rate i n Thailand, by quarter, 1993q1–2013q2 (percentage-p oint 

























































































































































Figure 14. Monthly terms of trade between export an d import prices in Thailand, January 2000–September  

































Source: Bank of Thailand, excel file (EC_EI_019: Trade Indices and Terms of Trade). 
 
 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 30
Figure 15. GDP growth rate (%) and net portfolio fl ows in Thailand, 2005q1 to 2013q2 (relative to its average 













































Source: Bank of Thailand, www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/Pages/index1.aspx [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
 
Summary and assessment 
 
The Thai economy demonstrated a remarkable rate of growth of output, exports and employment for more 
than 30 years, from 1960 to 1996. Subsequently, output and employment growth have become 
considerably slower, though well above rates for the majority of developing countries. Of more concern 
for employment, poverty and general welfare, the macroeconomy has displayed substantial instability. 
 
There are obvious policy components to the instabili y. First and perhaps most important, since the Asian 
crisis, fiscal policy has been procyclical. Second, the overall impact of monetary policy since 2000 
appears, at best, ambiguous regarding growth. Third, a shift from mild regulation to strong deregulation 
of the external sector, especially the capital account, leaves the Government with few tools to effect what 
appears to be a major source of macroeconomic instability.30 
 
Countries do not achieve full and productive employment without pursuing policies designed for this 
goal. Until the global crisis of 2008, the Thai economy grew at a rate more than sufficient to provide full 
and productive employment for its residents. Through application of appropriate policies, the 
Government can create the tools to convert growth into fuller or high employment, rising real wages and 
job security. 
 
                                                 
30 To quote from a UNESCAP policy brief, “Asia–Pacifi countries have already introduced several measures to manage 
excessive short-term capital flows while still encouraging FDI. Therefore, capital account openness should not be viewed as an 
all-or-nothing proposition. Capital account can be open to equity flows – both portfolio and FDI, even when money and bond 
flows are managed.” (MPDD, 2013a, p. 2) 
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3.3 Case study of Viet Nam 
 
Economic trends pre- and post-global crisis 
 
With few exceptions, general discussions with policy-makers and researchers in Viet Nam have focused 
on a perception of declining growth potential for the economy. The explanations given for this decline are 
a weak financial sector burdened with non-performing loans and failure by the Government to restructure 
state-owned enterprises. The argument concludes that if these structural obstacles were to be overcome, 
further export growth would be the driving force for higher growth rates.  
 
Some discussions extended a pejorative assessment of current growth rates to the entire period since the 
re-orientation of the economy under the Dổi Mới policy (explained in Vuong et al., 2011). The central 
contention is that economic growth in Viet Nam over the past two decades compares unfavourably to the 
performance of China. The simplest statement of this position is: China grew consistently at 10 per cent, 
why not Viet Nam? 
 
An assessment of the health of the financial sector in Viet Nam and of the need for change in state-owned 
enterprises lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, some general comments apply. First, for almost 
20 years, bilateral and multilateral development agencies predicted that the lack of fundamental changes 
in the financial sector and state enterprises present d an imminent barrier to rapid growth. During much 
of that time, Viet Nam enjoyed a growth rate far above the average for low- and medium-income 
countries.  
 
Second, citing the financial sector and state enterprises as obstacles to faster growth requires a cler 
explanation of the nature of these obstacles and how pr posed structural changes would overcome them. 
Without specifics, the argument for changes in financi l institutions and state enterprises is of limited 
usefulness, rather like past assertions that "pro-market reforms" would automatically result in faster 
growth. 
 
Finally, the argument that China's faster growth provides prima facie evidence of an inadequate growth 
performance in Viet Nam should not be taken seriously. In effect, the argument poses the question, why
did Viet Nam not grow faster than the fastest-growing country in the world? The simple answer to that 
question is, by definition, only one country can have the fastest-growth rate, and which country achieves 
it reflects many influences, some of them domestic and others external. The more complex answer 
involves identifying the sources of China's rapid growth rather than treating that growth as the normal 
outcome to which every other country can or should aspire. 
 
The comparison of China to Viet Nam, or any other country, raises a fundamental issue. What is the 
appropriate growth target for policy-makers in each country? Seeking the fastest achievable growth rate 
cannot be justified by either economic or social arguments. Basic economic theory informs us that faster 
growth requires a larger share of investment in natio l income. As rapid growth continues, the economy 
approaches full capacity, and increasing investment requires foregoing current expenditure by households 
or the public sector. A rational economic design of gr wth policy thus requires assessment of the trade-off 
between current expenditure and future expenditure. Only by chance would that assessment result in 
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policy-makers choosing the maximum achievable growth ra e. 
 
The social costs of growth can be quite high, as China’s performance over the past 20 years demonstrate . 
The most obvious of these costs are environmental damage, income and wealth inequality and 
unmanageable rates of urbanization. For example, the severe level of air pollution in Hanoi demonstrates 
clearly a major cost of growth. 
 
An assessment of the growth performance in Viet Nam should be placed in the context of four principles: 
(i) Seeking the maximum achievable growth rate is not rational policy; (ii) Comparisons to China are of 
limited relevance; (iii) Structural changes in finance and state enterprises should be assessed for their own 
sake, not their growth impact; and (iv) The contribution of growth to generating full and productive 
employment is more important than the rate of growth itself. These considerations provide the guidelines 
to interpret figure 16. It is important to stress the third point. Reform of the financial sector should be 
designed to address its specific internal weaknesses. If done successfully, this will contribute to growth 
and development. If done for some derivative reason, uch as the probable impact on growth, the result 
might contribute to the goal in the short run while laying the basis for future financial instability. 
 
In the early and mid-1990s, economic growth in Viet Nam proceeded at an extremely rapid rate, in excess 
of 10 per cent in 1995. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–99 brought a sharp decline in growth, although 
the impact on Viet Nam proved considerably less than on any other country in the region, with the 
possible exception of China (Weeks, 2010). Following that crisis, growth recovered, averaging more than
7 per cent per annum from 1999 to 2006. In 2007, the global economic crisis again caused a sharp decline 
in the growth rate, followed by recovery to a level at about 1.5 percentage points below the pre-crisis rate. 
 
The growth performance shown in Figure 16 prompts several conclusions. First, compared with most 
countries in the region, especially Thailand, economic growth in Viet Nam over the past 20 years was 
rapid and stable. Second, the growth performance demonstrates a clear pattern of adjustments to lower 
sustainable growth, in excess of 8 per cent per annum i  the early 1990s, to about 7 per cent in the pre-
crisis 2000s, and 5–6 per cent after the global crisis. 
 
A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on the Vietnamese economy in 2004 
predicted this pattern of step-wise movements to a slower sustainable level, on the basis of the following 
analysis (Weeks et al., 2004). In the first years of the transition from central planning to market 
regulation, the Vietnamese economy expanded rapidly as households and businesses exploited the 
advantages of greater flexibility in production and consumption. Government policies in favour of export 
growth provided a strong external growth stimulus (Weeks, 2001). At the same time, labour migration 
from low-productivity agriculture to industry raised output per worker. Large inflows of private 
investment supplemented domestic sources of capital formation. 
 
Through the 2000s, the impact of growth-enhancing factors associated with structural transition declind, 
leaving investment in capacity and improvements in the labour force as the central sources of increases in 
economic potential. As in the 1990s, the external sector provided a major stimulus on the demand side. 
Figure 17 indicates that domestic capital formation reached its peak of almost 40 per cent of GDP just 
before the global crisis of 2008, then returned to nearly that level in the 1990s and early 2000s, at 30–35 
per cent. If net capital formation were about 5 percentage points lower and the capital output ratio in the 
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range of 4–5 per cent, the implied growth of capacity would be 5–6 per cent, the actual rate after the 
crisis. 
 
Inspection of Figure 17 also suggests that it would be highly unlikely that the external sector will continue 
to be a major source of demand stimulus. In 2012, export earnings reached 80 per cent of GDP.31 If the 
external sector were to continue to function as an engine of growth, this would imply that exports were 
growing faster than GDP and that the export-GDP ratio was approaching 100 per cent. While this is 
conceivable, it would be unprecedented for a country with Viet Nam's population and would be subject to 
diminishing returns at the extensive margin. 
 
These key statistics for the investment and export shares indicate that 5–6 per cent represents the 
sustainable growth rate for Viet Nam. With a population growth rate of 1 per cent, this growth rate 
implies a doubling of per capita income in 15 years. Since 2006, this rate of growth has been consistent 
with a stable distribution of income (ILSSA, 2012, p. 79), which contrasts with the strong trend towards 
inequality in the 1990s and first half of the 2000s (Weeks et al., 2004, pp. 47–49). If this growth rate 
remains consistent with no increase in inequality, it should be sufficient to provide for full and productive 
employment, with declining poverty rates. 
 

















































































































































Notes: yr-yr (NSA)=rate of growth compared to same quarter previous year, not seasonally adjusted; yr-yr (4 qrtr MA)=moving average of current three 
preceding quarters of same time series. 
Source: ADB, http://aric.adb.org/indicators/Real_Sector_and_Prices/R_VIE_Q_Real_Sector_and_Prices.htm [accessed 14 Nov. 2014]. 
 
                                                 
31 The ratio of export value added to GDP was considerably smaller. 
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As in other transition countries, Viet Nam suffered from large public sector deficits with the end of 
central planning. These deficits occurred because in the central planning period, revenue derived from the 
surpluses of state enterprises whose profitability collapsed with the change to market regulation. The
Vietnamese Government achieved a shift to a tax-based revenue system relatively smoothly. 
 
Figure 18 shows the current and overall fiscal balances. For the 19 years from 1994 to 2012, only once 
did the overall balance exceed 3 per cent of GDP (in 2001). The current account balance averaged a 
surplus of more than 6 per cent of GDP. This large surplus financed public sector investments, which 
made a major contribution to growth, accounting for up to 20 per cent of the demand stimulus in the 
1990s (Weeks et al., 2004, p. 33). This is in contrast to Thailand, where public investment was relatively 
small and the current account surplus over the same years was just 1 per cent of GDP.  
 
The major role of public investment in Viet Nam and its comparative absence in Thailand partly explains 
the stability of growth in the former country, compared with the latter. In every country, private 
investment displays a procyclical pattern and, along with external demand, is the major cause of cyclial 
output instability. Public investment is inherently countercyclical, and its absence strengthens procyclical 
disturbances. Unlike current expenditure, the countercyclical role of public investment is non-
discretionary. Because investment projects typically t ke several years to construct, they impart stability 
to aggregate demand over the cycle. 
 
Current expenditure was also considerably more stable in Viet Nam than in Thailand. The stability of 
public sector current demand in Viet Nam is demonstrated in figure 19, which should be compared with 
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the same chart for Thailand (figure 8). During 1994–2012, the coefficient of variation of current 
expenditure in Viet Nam was 0.3; that is, the standard deviation was only a third of the mean variation. 
By contrast, for Thailand the coefficient of variation exceeded 3. 
 
In summary, growth stability in Viet Nam resulted from the stability of public expenditure, both current 
and capital. Stability of public expenditure provided countercyclical smoothing of aggregate demand to 
compensate for external shocks to exports and private nvestment. Stability of growth maintained stability 
in revenue flows, which maintained low variability n the public sector fiscal balances. The Vietnamese 
case demonstrates the effectiveness of sound, countercyclical fiscal policy.  
 
Figure 18. Fiscal balances in Viet Nam, 1994–2012 
 
Source: ADB, 2013. 
 




Source: ADB, 2013. 
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Monetary policy 
 
The State Bank of Vietnam functions as the country's central bank and takes responsibility for monetary 
policy. Unlike all the other central banks in the region, the State Bank operates under guidance from the 
Government. The absence of so-called independence facilitates the coordination of the monetary and 
fiscal policies. 
 
Experts from the State Bank describe monetary policy as supportive of fiscal policy. During the global 
crisis of 2008–09, the State Bank implemented an expansionary monetary policy in an attempt to mitigate 
the impact of external shocks. The internal assessmnt by State Bank officials was that the monetary 
policy was successful overall, though in some cases excessively expansionary.  
 
Figure 20 tends to support the State Bank narrative. Th  chart shows the ratio of domestic credit to to al 
GDP and to "private GDP" (total GDP minus agriculture, public administration and the "other" category). 
The second measure seeks to approximate the ratio of credit to private enterprises, organized along 
capitalist principles. The credit measures are compared with movements in the GDP deflator. The slow 
growth of the credit to GDP ratios in the 1990s coin ided with a fall in the GDP price deflator. During 
2001–07, the continuous rise in the credit ratios matched a similar trend in the deflator.  
 
The domestic credit ratios rose rapidly during 2008–10 and then declined in 2011 and 2012. The highest 
rates of inflation occurred during 2008–12, though the annual movements do not match those of the credit 
ratios. Comparing the changes in the GDP price deflator with the credit ratios suggests a considerably 
more complex inflationary process than in the various manifestations of the quantity theory of money 
hypothesis. Nonetheless, credit expansion appears to have been unnecessarily expansionary after 2007, as 
State Bank officials suggest. This excessive credit expansion was associated with sharp fluctuations in the 
rate of inflation rather than an inflationary spiral. Despite the moments of excessive monetary expansion, 
the accommodating monetary policy could be judged as successful. 
 
Figure 21 reflects another indicator of monetary accommodation of fiscal policy – the inflation-deflated 
deposit rate, which is not a policy instrument but an outcome. With this in mind, it would appear that the 
measures implemented by the State Bank resulted in low and negative interest rates after 2007. The extnt 
to which these low rates mitigated falls in private investment cannot be assessed with the available 
statistics. The rates, however, provide further support for the conclusion that the State Bank implemented 
a countercyclical monetary policy that supported the growth of the real economy without generating 
destabilizing inflation.  
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Notes: DmCredit/GDP is the ratio of domestic credit to total GDP. DmCredit/PrvGDP is the ratio of domestic credit to private GDP (total GDP minus 
agriculture, public administration and "other").  
Source: ADB, 2013. 
 























































































Note: The real borrowing rate is the 12-month deposit rate minus the GDP deflator. 




The most striking aspect of the external account of Viet Nam is the extraordinary growth of trade. In 
1994, exports of goods and services were $4 billion and rose in 2012 to $115 billion (figure 22). Equally 
striking, the increase in export revenue did not result in sustained trade surpluses. On the contrary, a trade 
balance in 1999 was followed by 12 consecutive years of deficits, until a tiny surplus of $1 billion i 
2012. 
 
To a great extent, the growth of exports in the 1990s resulted from a conscious state trading policy that
sought to avoid the extreme instability of the countries of central Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
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Policy-makers in Viet Nam attributed much of the macroeconomic instability in those countries to a 
combination of sudden price deregulation and massive trade deficits. For Viet Nam, the solution to this 
apparently intractable dilemma was a trade policy bordering on mercantilism that resulted in the country 
becoming the world's third-largest rice exporter (Weeks et al., 2004). Export promotion continued after 
2000, stronger than before. By 2010–12, export earnings reached 80 per cent of GDP. 
 
The rapid growth of exports did not result primarily from the exchange rate policy. As Figure 23 shows, 
the nominal exchange depreciated almost continuously from 1994 to 2012, as measured by the official 
rate and the implicit export and import rates. Figure 24 provides the real exchange rates associated wi h 
the nominal movements. The commonly used measure of purchasing power parity (PPP) shows a 
substantial and continuous appreciation of 40 per cent from 1994 to 2012. 
 
The PPP rate provides little insight into competitiveness in trade. More relevant are the ratios of tradables 
to non-tradables, which indicate relative domestic returns. These show trends quite different from the PPP 
rate. The relative price of agricultural products to non-tradables substantially depreciated, while that for 
manufacturing remained almost constant. Real depreciation for agriculture might account for the export 
growth of that sector. But this does not explain the growth of manufacturing exports.  
 
It is possible that non-agricultural exports increased so rapidly due to more rapid productivity increas s in 
Viet Nam, compared with its export competitors. This explanation seems unlikely for two reasons. First, 
such a phenomenal growth of exports would imply a cross-country advantage in productivity growth that 
is hardly credible. Second, rapid productivity growth in tradables is typically associated with a trade 
surplus – not the deficits experienced by Viet Nam.  
 
Government policy interventions provide a probable explanation of the growth of trade rather than 
relative prices. If this is a correct interpretation, trade promotion policies may be approaching their 
practical limit. Further growth of exports would require further transfer of resources from non-tradables to 
tradables. As the share of resources in non-tradables declines, the productivity of further transfer would 
be expected to decline. Vietnamese policy should consider a growth strategy more focused on domestic 
investment, both public and private.  
 
As a final observation on external policies, the discussion returns to the theme of the stability of Viet 
Nam's growth rate. Figure 25 shows the three major external balances: for trade, the current account and 
the capital account. These are complemented by Figure 26, which presents long-term capital flows and 
foreign reserves in months of imports. The external balances demonstrate shocks to exports, which 
resulted in a substantial trade deficit in 2008. In the short term, a large increase in the capital account 
balance covered the current account deficit, followed by a rapid increase in exports to re-establish 
external stability in the medium term. 
 
Figure 26 elaborates on the external adjustment during 2008–12. A sharp de-accumulation of reserves in 
2008 mitigated the potential short-term instability. The capital account surplus resulted from increases in 
direct investment and other long-term flows (including official inflows from bilateral and multilateral 
sources). The Vietnamese adjustment to external shock  stands in marked contrast to the Thai adjustment 
in which severe fluctuations in the trade and capital accounts reinforced each other to destabilize the 
growth rate (see Figures 3 and 15). 
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The contrast between smooth and unstable adjustment to the global shocks at the end of the 2000s has an 
obvious explanation: regulated versus liberalized external accounts. In Viet Nam, limitations on the 
convertibility of the dong combined with relatively small portfolio flows. This combination had two 
important policy consequences: (i) It imparted to the external account an automatic countercyclical 
mechanism; and (ii) it facilitated management of the capital account by policy-makers. The 
countercyclical mechanism resulted because the restrictions on convertibility prevented capital outflow 
when the external account weakened.  
   
Figure 22. Exports, imports and trade balance in Vi et Nam, 1994–2012 (current $ billion) 
 
Source: ADB, 2013. 
 



















































Note: The export and import rates are calculated by dividing trade in dong by trade in US dollars. 
Source: ADB, 2013. 
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Figure 24. Real exchange rates in Viet Nam, tradabl es, non-tradables and PPP, 1994–2012 
 
Source: ADB, 2013. 
 
 
Figure 25. External balances in Viet Nam, 1995–2012  ($ billion)  
 
Note: Capital account measured as the overall balance minus the current balance. 
Source: ADB, 2013. 
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Source: ADB, 2013. 
 
 
Summary and assessment 
 
Although the macroeconomic policies of the Vietnamese Government suffered from mistakes of timing 
and execution, evidence suggests that they contributed to the stability of growth over the past 20 years. 
This stability is in contrast to the growth performance in Thailand. The lack of reliable employment 
statistics covering the two decades makes it impossible to assess progress towards full and productive 
employment. Any attempt to assess the employment impact of growth by necessity is speculative. With 
this in mind, I assessed that the rate and stability of growth provided a framework sufficient for the 
outcome, if combined with equitable wage and distribu ion policies. 
 
The growth process in Viet Nam is not without its problems. The frequently cited need to restructure the 
financial sector and state enterprises may prove of secondary importance to a flaw in the growth strategy 
itself. As explained in previous sections, the Vietnamese Government achieved a remarkably smooth 
transition from central planning to market regulation by pursing an export-led growth strategy. Rapidly 
expanding exports combined with long-term capital inflow to stabilize the exchange rate, which 
facilitated price stability. 
 
For several reasons, the economy may now press against the limits of the export-led strategy. An export-
led strategy requires the continuous transfer of resources from non-tradables to tradables. Because both 
categories of goods require that labourers have sector-specific skills, the productivity of the labour 
transfer is likely to decline at the extensive margin. With few exceptions, capital is product specific, 
which implies that the labour transfer must be accompanied by an increase in investment. With 
investment well over 30 per cent of GDP in Viet Nam now, more investment is likely to generate 
diminishing growth. 
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Second, the likelihood is low that the global economy will soon deliver the high rates of growth of trade 
that prevailed before the global crisis. A commonly expressed hope among researchers in Viet Nam, 
though less frequent among policy-makers, is that te problem of slow growth in international trade 
might be overcome by the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership. It is not obvious that this US-proposed 
trade agreement will increase export opportunities for Viet Nam. The US Senate might not approve this 
treaty in the near future and perhaps even reject it. Were it to be approved by the US Senate, Vietnamese 
policy-makers would need to assess the balance between trade creation and trade diversion. It is not clear 
what advantages the Partnership would bring to VietNam that are not currently provided by membership 
in the World Trade Organization. 
 
There can be no question that exports as well as employ ent creation drove the rapid growth of the 
Vietnamese economy over the past 20 years. Global economic prospects and proposed re-organization of 
domestic finance and state enterprises suggest that a more diversified strategy is now required. This 
strategy could place greater emphasis on equity via rising wages and domestic demand. Enhancing the 
voice of workers' organizations would be an important aspect of the broader and more equitable strategy. 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 43
References 
 
Alp, H.; Elekdag, S. 2012. Shock therapy! What role for Thai monetary policy?, Working Paper 12/269 
(Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund). 
Asian Development Bank. 2000. Asian development outlook update 2000 (Manila). 
—. 2013. Asian development outlook update 2013: Governance and public service delivery (Manila). 
Ayisi, R. 2013. "Single-digit inflation targeting and economic growth", in American Journal of 
Economics and Business Administration, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 22–28. 
Baba, C.; Kokenyne, A. 2001. Effectiveness of capital controls in selected emerging markets in the 2000s, 
Working Paper 11/281 (Washington, DC, IMF). 
Boskin, M. 1996. Toward a more accurate measure of the cost of living, Boskin Commission Report 
(Washington, DC, Social Security Administration). Also available at: 
www.ssa.gov/history/reports/boskinrpt.html [14 Nov. 2014].  
Bruno, M.; Easterly, W. 1998. "Inflation cries and long-run growth", in Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Vol. 41, pp. 3–26. 
Cavallo, E.; Galiani, S.; Noy, I.; Pantano, J. 2010. Catastrophic natural disasters and economic growth 
(Santiago, Inter-American Development Bank). 
Chowdhury, A.  2005a. Exchange rate policy and poverty reduction: Thematic report on the 
macroeconomics of poverty reduction (Colombo, United Nations Development Programme). 
—. 2005b. Monetary policy and poverty reduction: Thematic report on the macroeconomics of poverty 
reduction (Colombo, United Nations Development Programme) 
Chritiaensen, L.; Loayza, N.; Olaberria, E.A.; Rigol ni, J. 2012. "Natural disasters and growth: Going 
beyond the averages", in World Development, Vol. 40, No. 7, pp. 1317–1336. 
Dow, S.C. 2006. "Endogenous money: Structuralist", in P. Arestis; M. Sawyer (eds): A handbook of 
alternative monetary economics (Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar). 
Friedman, M. 1968. “The role of monetary policy”, in American Economic Review, Vol. 58.  
Galli, R.; van der Hoeven, R. 2001. Is inflation bad for income inequality: The importance of the initial 
rate of inflation (Geneva, ILO). 
Gyntelberg, J.; Loretan, M.; Subhanij, T. 2012. "Exchange rate fluctuations and international portfolio 
rebalancing in Thailand", Working Paper 12/214 (Washington, DC, IMF). 
Hailu, D.; Weeks, J. 2009. “Can low income countries adopt counter-cyclical policies?”, in One Pager 92 
(Brasilia, International Centre for Inclusive Growth). 
Howells, P. 2006. "The endogeneity of money: Empirical evidence", in P. Arestis; M. Sawyer (eds): A 
handbook of alternative monetary economics (Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar). 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 44
Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA). 2012. Labour and social trends in Viet Nam 2012 
(Hanoi). 
International Labour Organization (ILO). 2013. Thailand: A labour market profile (Bangkok). 
ILO; Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (ILO and OECD). 2011. Promoting 
policy coherence for decent work and full and productive employment: A policy note for the G20 Meeting 
of Labour and Employment Ministers (Paris). 
—. 2013. Thailand: A labour market profile (Bangkok). 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2006. Thailand: Selected issues, Country Report 06/19 (Washington, 
DC). 
—. 2008. Thailand: Selected issues, Country Report 00/194 (Washington, DC). 
—. 2009a. Financial sector stability assessment, Country Report 09/147 (Washington, DC). 
—. 2009b. Thailand: Report on observance of standards and codes: Fiscal transparency module, 
Country Report 09/250 (Washington, DC). 
—. 2012. Thailand 2012: Article 4 consultation, Country Report 12/124 (Washington, DC). 
Isnawangsih, A.; Klyuev, V.; Zhang, L. 2013. "The big split: Why did output trajectories in the ASEAN-4 
diverge after the global financial crisis?", Working Paper 13/222 (Washington, DC). 
Lavoie, M. 2006. "Endogenous money: Accommodationist", n P. Arestis; M. Sawyer (eds): A handbook 
of alternative monetary economics (Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar). 
Losman, D. 1980. "Quality bias in price indices", in Review of Social Economy, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 75–
80. 
Nidhiprabha, B. 2013. Monetary policy and the labor market in Thailand (Bangkok, ILO). 
Paldam, M. 1998. "Does economics growth lead to political stability?", in S. Borner; M. Paldam (eds): 
The political dimension of economic growth (London, Palgrave). 
Quah, D. 2000. Cross country growth comparison: Theory to empirics (London, Department of 
Economics, London School of Economics). 
Son, H.H.; San Andres, E.A. 2009. How has Asia fared in the global crisis? A tale of three countries: 
Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Thailand, Economics Working Paper Series 174 (Manila, ADB). 
Townsend, R.M.; Ueda, K. 2007. Welfare gains from financial liberalization, Working Paper 07/154 
(Washington, DC, IMF). 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). 2010. World economic situation 
and prospects 2010: Global outlook (New York). 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2011. Trade and development report 
2011: Post-crisis policy challenges in the world economy (Geneva). 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 45
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP); Macroeconomic 
Policy and Development Division (MPDD). 2013a. Development macroeconomics, MPDD Policy Briefs 
No. 13 (Bangkok). 
—. 2013b. Forward-looking macroeconomic policies – Re-examining inflation and debt limits, MPDD 
Policy Briefs No. 14 (Bangkok). 
—. 2013c. Facing a sluggish and volatile global economy, MPDD Policy Briefs No. 15 (Bangkok). 
—. 2013d. Minimum wage policies to boost inclusive growth, MPDD Policy Briefs No. 16 (Bangkok). 
—. 2013e. Making emerging Asia-Pacific less vulnerable to global financial panics, MPDD Policy Briefs 
No. 16 (Bangkok, UNESCAP). 
van Waeyenberge, E.; Bargawi, H. 2011 Macroeconomic policy for “full and productive employment and 
decent work for all”: Uganda country study, Employment Working Paper No. 91 (Geneva, ILO). 
Vu Tuan Khai. 2012 Estimates of quarterly GDP for Viet Nam, Working Paper (Tokyo, Department of 
Economics, Meisei University). 
Vuong, Q.H.; Dam, V.N,; Van Houtte, D.; and Tran, T.D. 2011. "The entrepreneurial facets as precursor 
to Viet Nam's economic renovation in 1986", in The IUP Journal of Entrepreneurship Development, Vol. 
VIII, pp. 4, 6–47. 
Weeks, J. 2001. "A tale of two transitions: Cuba and Viet Nam after the collapse of the Soviet Union", i  
C. Brundenius; J. Weeks (eds): Globalisation and third world socialism: Cuba and Viet Nam (London, 
Macmillan).  
—. 2010 "Miracles and crisis: Boom, collapse and recov ry in East and Southeast Asia", in R. Westra 
(ed.): Confronting global neoliberalism: Third world resistance and development strategies (Atlanta, GA, 
Clarity Press), 170–191. 
—. 2012 The irreconcilable inconsistencies of neoclassical economics: False paradigm (Oxford, 
Routledge). 
—. 2013a "Open economy monetary policy reconsidered", in Review of Political Economy, Vol. 25, No. 
1, 57–68. 
—. 2013b "A progressive international monetary system: Growth-enhancing, speculation-reducing and 
cross-country equity", in P. Arestis; M. Sawyer (eds): Economic policies, governance and the new 
economics (London, Palgrave). 
Weeks, J.; Mungule, O. 2013 Determinants of the Zambian Kwacha (London, International Growth 
Centre). Also available at: www.theigc.org/publications/working-paper/determinants-zambian-kwacha 
[14 Nov. 2014].  
Weeks, J.; Nguyen, T.; Roy, R.; Lim, J. 2004. Macroeconomics of poverty reduction: Case study of Viet
Nam, growth with equity (Hanoi, UNDP). 
World Bank. 1993 The East Asian miracle: Economic growth and public policy (Washington, DC and 
New York, World Bank and Oxford University Press). 
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 46
Annex. Relevant extracts from  
the terms of reference 
 
1. Fundamental objectives and constraints 
 
“…[A]n approach that focuses on engendering predictabili y and stability in key nominal aggregates that 
are used to depict both internal balance (inflation, fiscal sustainability) and external balance (current 
account deficits and external indebtedness) using either implicit or explicit prudential thresholds (such as 
low, single digit inflation or pre-determined limits on fiscal deficits regardless of understanding countries 
existing economic structures and conditions) remains disconnected from the broader economic goals of 
growth, structural transformation, employment and poverty reduction. Furthermore, the conventional 
focus on macroeconomic stability has not adequately equipped policy-makers – both in rich and poor 
countries – to either anticipate or readily cope with global economic volatility and interdependence. The 
Survey 2013 highlighted that a long-term macroeconomic simulation exercise showed that governments 
could pursue inclusive and sustainable development while maintaining fiscal sustainability and price 
stability at the same time. The report suggested that ere was not necessarily a trade-off between 
economic growth, social development and environmental sustainability. The three pillars of sustainable 
development can support and strengthen each other, thus challenging the ‘grow first’ paradigm.” 
 
2. Policy areas 
 
“The country-level studies will seek to establish by examining four policy areas – monetary policy, fiscal 
policy, exchange rate policy and capital account management – the alignment between macroeconomic 
management and the broader economic goals of growth, structural change, employment and poverty 
reduction, and their potential impact on macroeconomic sustainability since the 1990s. A list of salient 
issues – and the pertinent methods of enquiry –that s ould be applied in the country studies by each 
policy area is enumerated below, especially by drawing lessons from the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis 
and the 2008–09 global financial and economic crisis in these two countries under consideration. The 
relevant policy recommendations will then follow from such an investigation.” 
 
3. Policy instruments 
 
“(A) Overall, identification of key macroeconomic outcomes of concern in the country, from the 
perspectives of macroeconomic management, employment and labour market outcomes and 
inclusive growth 
 
1. Some broad assessment should be made on whether the concerns are of short- or longer-term nature, 
and whether the current macroeconomic policy respones and framework are adequate in addressing such 
macroeconomic concerns. By macroeconomic policy framework, it is meant to address cases where 
certain macroeconomic instruments may not be ‘effectiv ’ and play a secondary role to other 
macroeconomic policy targets and key instruments used to attain these targets (e.g. fiscal policy may pl
a secondary adjustment-oriented role, as against proactive allocative or redistributive role, to inflation-
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targeting monetary policy). In the case of Thailand and Viet Nam, the macroeconomic outcomes of 
concern may include: fiscal sustainability, current account deficits asset price, inflation, and exchange rate 
movements, among others.  
 
2. An assessment of the mechanism by which macroecon mic outcomes affect employment and labour 
market outcomes, as well as the likely extent of such impact. In other words, to what extent are 
macroeconomic outcomes and policy framework acting as a constraint or an enabler to generation of 
decent work and enhancement of productivity (within the existing sectors and mobility towards 
productive employment opportunities)?  
 
3. An assessment of the compatibility of macroeconomic policy framework and macroeconomic 
outcomes with the objectives of poverty reduction, nclusive growth and decent work for all.  
 
4. To what extent can differences in macroeconomic policy framework and responses explain the 
differences in outcomes between the 1997–98 and 2008–09 crises in terms of poverty and decent work?  
 
5. What policy lessons can be learned from comparative experiences of Thailand and Viet Nam in the 
macroeconomic policy framework that would be needed to reduce poverty and inequality and promote 
decent work opportunities?”  
 
4. Monetary policy 
 
“(B) Key macroeconomic policy instruments and their impact on employment and poverty: 
monetary policy  
 
1. What are the current de jure and de facto goals and targets of monetary policy with respect to: (a) 
inflation; (b) growth; and; (c) employment and poverty?  
 
2. What are the salient institutional and socio-economic forces (both domestic and external11) that have 
shaped the de jure and de facto goals and targets since the 1990s?  
 
3. Has the central bank been actively engaged in: (a) directed credit allocation to influence structural 
transformation; (e.g. through designation of priority industries/sectors); (b) promoting initiatives that 
enhance access to credit by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and microenterprises; and (c) 
promoting microfinance institutions? Has the central b nk’s policy on these changed as a result of 
financial sector deregulation in the 1990s?  
 
4. Does the central bank use any early warning signals to anticipate external shocks and/or monitor asset 
price bubbles, especially after its experience in the 1990s?  
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5. Does the central bank systematically use any monitoring and evaluation system to gauge the impact of 
their policies on employment and poverty?  
 
6. Did the central bank use expansionary monetary policy in coping with the consequences of the Great 
Recession of 2008–09? How does that differ from its stance during the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis?  
 
7. What is the current and projected stance of monetary policy? 
 
8. After taking stock of (1) to (7) above, is it possible to arrive at an overall assessment on the extent to 
which monetary policy either helped or hindered theprocess of durable and productive employment 
creation, poverty reduction and lower income inequality?  
 
9. What needs to change for monetary policy to more eff ctively support the process of employment 
creation, poverty reduction and lower income inequality?”  
 
5. Fiscal policy 
 
“C) Key macroeconomic policy instruments and their impact on employment and poverty: fiscal 
policy  
 
1. What are the current de jure and de facto goals and targets of fiscal policy with respect to: (a) fiscal 
sustainability and avoidance of ‘fiscal dominance’; (b) growth; and (c) employment and poverty?  
 
2. What are the salient institutional and socio-economic forces (both domestic and external13) that have 
shaped the de jure and de facto goals and targets since the 1990s?  
 
3. Does the analysis of public finances enable one t  ascertain the extent to which: (a) expenditure and t x 
policy is being used to support the process of structu al transformation (e.g. through designation of 
priority industries/sectors); and (b) promoting and enforcing labour market policies and institutions within 
the context of a social floor, especially for SMEs and young entrepreneurs that require sustainable fiscal 
resource allocations?  
 
4. What is the current government spending/expenditure profile on the key elements of productive 
employment creations, health care, education, vocational education and training systems, employment 
services, and other labour market institutions?  
 
5. Does the finance ministry use any early warning signals to anticipate external shocks and/or engagi 
in “stress tests” to assess the capacity of fiscal policy to respond to external shocks, especially after the 
experience in the 1990s?  
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6. Does the finance ministry systematically use any monitoring and evaluation system to gauge the impact 
of their policies on employment, poverty and inequality?  
 
7. Have proactive measures been put in place to enhance fiscal space during buoyant periods of economic 
growth to finance various components of the social protection system including policies to reduce labour 
market inequalities by improving unemployment protection schemes and public investment in physical 
infrastructure?  
 
8. Did the finance ministry use expansionary fiscal policy in coping with the consequences of the Great 
Recession of 2008–09? How does this differ from the fiscal policy stance during the 1997–98 Asian 
financial crisis?  
 
9. What is the current and projected stance of fiscal policy? Is there evidence of fiscal consolidation?  
 
10. After taking stock of (1) to (9) above, is it possible to arrive at an overall assessment on the extent to 
which fiscal policy either helped or hindered the process of durable and productive employment creation, 
poverty reduction and lower income and labour inequality 11. What needs to change for fiscal policy to 
more effectively support the process of employment creation, poverty reduction and lower income and 
labour market inequality?”  
 
6. Exchange rate policy 
 
“(D) Key macroeconomic policy instruments and their impact on employment and poverty: 
exchange rate policy  
 
1. What are the current de facto and de juregoals and targets of exchange rate policy with respect to (a) 
international competitiveness; (b) protecting domestic and import-competing sectors; and (c) using 
exchange rate policy as part of an ant inflation strategy?  
 
2. How can one characterize the current exchange rate regime: (a) fixed; (b) floating; and (c) managed?  
 
3. What are the salient institutional and socio-economic forces (both domestic and external) that have 
shaped the de jure and de facto goals and targets and the evolution of the exchange rate regime since the 
1990s?  
 
4. Was exchange rate policy systematically used to support the process of structural transformation, most 
notably by stimulating the development of export-oriented sectors, especially for the SMEs?  
 
5. Have policy-makers systematically made use of monitoring and evaluation system to assess the impact 
of exchange rate policy on employment and poverty?  
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6. Was exchange rate policy used (e.g. a significant, o e-off devaluation) as part of counter-cyclical 
policies to deal with the Great Recession? How does that differ from the exchange rate policies during 
the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis?  
 
7. After taking stock of (1) to (6) above, is it possible to possible to arrive at an overall assessment on the 
extent to which exchange rate policy either helped or hindered the process of durable and productive 
employment creation and poverty reduction?  
 
8. What needs to change for exchange rate policy to more effectively support the process of employment 
creation and poverty reduction?” 
 
7. Capital account management 
 
“(E) Key macroeconomic policy instruments and their impact on employment and poverty: capital 
account management  
 
1. What are the current de facto and de jure goals and targets of capital account management with respect 
to: (a) encouraging financial integration through capital flows; and (b) enhancing national policy space?  
 
2. How can one characterize the current capital account regime: (a) open; and (b) regulated?  
 
3. What are the salient institutional and socio-economic forces (both domestic and external) that have 
shaped the de jure and de facto goals and targets and the evolution of the capital account regime since the 
1990s?  
 
4. What has been the interaction between exchange rate policy and capital account management? What 
are the consequences – both direct and indirect – for employment and poverty? How does this policy help 
to stabilize financial sector?  
 
5. Have capital controls and other prudential measures been used to cope with global economic volatility 
and during the Great Recession? How does that differ from the capital account policies during the 1997–
98 Asian financial crisis?  
 
6. After taking stock of (1) to (5) above, is it possible to arrive at an overall assessment on the extent to 
which capital account management has either helped or hindered the process of durable and productive 
employment creation and poverty reduction?  
 
7. What needs to change in the sphere of capital account management to more effectively support the 
process of employment creation and poverty reduction?”  
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“(F) Institutional arrangements for design and delivery of macroeconomic policies  
The country studies should also offer a succinct acount of the institutional arrangements for the design 
and delivery of macroeconomic policies at the country level. While the mandate for such policies usually 
lies with the Central Bank and the Ministries of Finance, to what extent is there an attempt at policy 
coherence through interministerial coordination? Is there any agency within the government that monitors 
such coherence? To what extent are contemporary institutional arrangements (such as central bank 
independence) shaped by external forces (such as IMF agreements)? Has there been any policy and 
institutional change after the 1997–98 Asian financi l risis and/or the Great Recession of 2008–09? And 
if so, what is the format of the new institutional arrangements in Thailand and Viet Nam?” 
 
8. Collection of information 
 
“Multiple methods of analysis and assessment will be used. These include (but are not limited to):  
1. Literature review on macroeconomic policy debate at the global level and in the context of the country 
under review, including evaluation of official policy documents and guidelines, especially incorporating 
the policy stance during 1997–98 Asian financial crisis and the Great Recession of 2008–09. 
  
2. Consultations with at least 10–15 key informants. The institutions that can be covered include: Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Planning, Central Bank, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Education, Ministry of 
Health, trade unions, employers’ organizations, United Nations system, including UNDP, IMF, ADB, 
World Bank, key research institutes (on macroeconomic policy, development studies, employment and 
labour), business media and members of the civil soc ety. These consultations should seek to highlight the 
diversity of views on macroeconomic policy in the country under review. The consultation should be 
guided by the issues specified above under each policy instrument.  
 
3. Use of online global databases, especially IMF assessments. There is a growing literature that utilizes 
IMF country assessments (such as article IV consultations and IMF agreements with Member States) to 
delineate and evaluate both actual and projected macroeconomic policy developments at the country 
level.14 In addition, one can use such global databases, apart from the United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and ILO, as the global competitiveness surveys maintained 
by the World Economic Forum, which usually includes country-specific data on macroeconomic stability.  
 
4. Use of national appropriate national data sources. On the main macroeconomic indicators (inflation, 
growth, etc.), there can be notable variations betwe n indicators derived from national data sources as 
against those published in international data bases. An assessment and a decision need to be made on the 
choice of data sources. For cross-country comparison purposes, an international data source may be 
advantageous. At the same time, on labour market indicators, national sources may provide greater 
information content that are not available in the int rnational databases.  
 
5. Analysis, using appropriate empirical techniques, of the link between macroeconomic policies, 
conventional policy targets and broader economic goals pertaining to growth, employment, structural 
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change, poverty reduction and lower income and labour market inequality using national and international 
data sources.”  
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Macroeconomic policies for full and productive employment: Case 
studies of Thailand and Viet Nam 
 
Perhaps the most important empirical finding of this study is the stability of quarterly and annual 
growth rates for Viet Nam and the contrasting instability for Thailand. Evidence strongly supports the 
view that this contrast results from the difference in macroeconomic policies in the two countries. 
Once policy-makers discard the ideology calling for continuously balanced budgets, focus can shift to 
identifying priorities for fiscal policies that facilitate stable growth. Stable growth would engender full 
and productive employment and an equitable distribution of growth for poverty reduction. These 
outcomes do not result automatically from the clearing of markets, if they clear at all.  
 
In support of full and productive employment, monetary policy both can and should pursue several 
objectives in addition to the stabilizing of prices. The two most obvious are: (i) facilitating productive 
investment through moderate and stable real interest rates; and (ii) reducing exchange rate fluctuations 
through what might be called exchange rate "smoothing". Exchange rate smoothing does not imply 
that a central bank attempts to maintain the national currency at a target rate to other currencies. 
 
In the pursuit of full and productive employment, the exchange rate serves as an important instrument. 
It should be part of a policy to shift resources towards tradables, if that shift is relevant. Interventions 
to smooth movements in the nominal exchange rate contribute to stability of aggregate output. 
 
 
